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Summary 
Historically, objections based on the freedom of thought, conscience and relig-
ion have been invoked in relation to compulsory military service. These consci-
entious objections are protected by national, regional and international human 
rights instruments. In the European Convention on Human Rights this right is 
grounded in Article 9 on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In 
Europe, the practice of conscientious objection is increasing in the healthcare 
context, specifically in relation to abortion procedures. This practice does not 
gain the same protection from regional and international human rights instru-
ments as the refusal to partake in compulsory military service. Having said this, 
the practice still gains protection at national level in a number of Member 
States of the Council of Europe. While allowing objectors to refuse to provide 
lawful abortion services, these states fail to control the practice effectively, 
creating a conflict with women’s access to lawful abortions. Despite the legal 
right to abortion, these women are denied effective access to it. 
 
The present study investigates the lack of regulation of conscientious objection 
to abortion in the Council of Europe setting, with the aim of clarifying whether 
additional regulation of the practice is required to secure women’s access to 
abortion on a national level as well as on a regional level. The study arrives at 
the conclusion that there is no clear answer as to what extent conscientious ob-
jection to abortion is protected under the regulation of the Council of Europe, 
because the regulation of conscientious objection to abortion is principally de-
cided on the state level, within the discretion of each state. There are, however, 
a number of critical parameters in relation to women’s access to lawful abortion 
that states are obliged to safeguard. These parameters set the limits of the 
state’s discretion in relation to the practice of conscientious objection on a na-
tional level. A number of cases demonstrate that these parameters are not se-
cured in all countries of Europe. This fact calls for increased regulation of con-
scientious objection to abortion in countries that allow this practice. 
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Sammanfattning 
Historiskt sett har människor gjort invändningar grundade på tankefrihet, 
samvetsfrihet och religionsfrihet i förhållande till obligatorisk värnpliktstjänst-
göring. Denna samvetsvägran inom militären är en erkänd rätt i nationella, 
regionala och internationella människorättsinstrument. I den Europeiska kon-
ventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande 
friheterna är denna rätt förankrad i artikel 9 om tankefrihet, samvetsfrihet och 
religionsfrihet. Runt om i Europa ökar bruket av samvetsvägran även i 
sjukvårdssammanhang, särskilt i relation till abort. Samvetsvägran i dessa 
sammanhang är dock inte berättigad till samma skydd från regionala och 
internationella människorättsinstrument som vägran att utföra obligatorisk 
värnplikt. I ett antal av Europarådets medlemsstater finns dock regler som gör 
det möjligt för sjukvårdspersonal att vägra utföra aborter. Dessa stater har dock 
till stor del misslyckats med att införa regler som gör det möjligt att begränsa 
och kontrollera utbredningen av samvetsvägran. När det inte finns en effektiv 
kontroll över hur många samvetsvägrare som finns på ett visst sjukhus eller 
inom en särskild region, riskerar kvinnor att inte få tillgång till abort, trots att 
hon har en laglig rätt till densamma. 
 
Föreliggande uppsats utreder Europarådets brist på reglering av samvetsvägran 
till laglig abort, i syfte att klargöra om ytterligare reglering krävs för att säkra 
kvinnors tillgång till abort på nationell och på regional nivå. Slutsatsen är att 
det är oklart i vilken utsträckning samvetsvägran till abort är skyddad av 
Europarådets reglering, eftersom detta bedöms från fall till fall. Eftersom 
Europarådets reglering är oklar, innebär det att regler kring samvetsvägran 
huvudsakligen beslutas på statlig nivå, inom det bedömningsutrymme dessa 
tilldelas av Europadomstolen. Det finns dock ett antal kriterier som begränsar 
staternas bedömningsutrymme och som syftar till att skydda kvinnors tillgång 
till laglig abort. Dessa kriterier är medlemsstaterna i Europarådet skyldiga att se 
till att de uppfylls och de sätter därmed gränserna för utövandet av 
samvetsvägran på nationell nivå. Ett antal rättsfall visar dock att tillgången till 
laglig abort inte är säkrad i alla länder i Europa. På grund av detta krävs en 
ökad reglering av samvetsvägran i de länder som tillåter sjukvårdspersonal att 
vägra utföra aborter. 
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1 Introduction 
Today, people with different beliefs and morals are often found living side by 
side. Despite creating opportunities for cultural, religious and philosophical 
exchange, the existence of fundamentally opposing viewpoints in the same en-
vironment suggests increasing conflict between people and the framework in 
which they exist. In instances in which an individual’s moral and religious be-
liefs are in direct opposition to the system in operation, he or she might refuse 
to adhere to mandated procedures required by said system. This act or omission 
is known as conscientious objection. 
 
Theoretically, it is possible to conscientiously object to anything. However, it 
could undermine the very essence of the legal system if a state allowed its citi-
zens to do so. As a result, it is inevitable that states need maintain tight regula-
tions on avenues for conscientious objection. Interestingly, despite the specific 
provisions permitting conscientious objections being regulated, there are cases 
showing that the actual use of conscientious objection might not be effectively 
monitored or controlled by the authorities.1 In the healthcare field, this can cre-
ate situations where it is impossible for a patient or prospective patient to know 
if he or she can expect to receive the healthcare provided by law or not. 
 
In the healthcare context, conscientious objection is most commonly invoked in 
relation to abortion.2 Problems arise when the will of the woman seeking a law-
ful abortion and the will of the assisting medical doctor are divergent. Since the 
medical doctor (hereinafter referred to as the healthcare provider) is in a posi-
tion of trust and authority in relation to women seeking abortion services, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that there is an imbalance between the two in this 
situation. One question to examine, therefore, is if Council of Europe Member 
States are adhering to both their negative and their positive obligations in rela-
tion to protecting women’s access to lawful abortion. Following this enquiry is 
the question of rule of law and law enforcement. Can a state, which has legal-
ised abortion but is not securing an actual access to abortion services, be said to 
be in accordance with the rule of law? 
 
Conscientious objection and women’s right to lawful abortion can be regulated 
on national, regional as well as international levels. The regulation on interna-
tional and regional levels control the national level to the extent a state has rati-
fied international and regional treaties.3 On a national level, there are many 
different solutions within European states on how to regulate abortion services 
                                                 
1
 Cf. chapters 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 5.1. 
2
 ACOG 2007, Obstetrics & Gynecology, p. 1203. 
3
 Linderfalk 2012, p. 77. 
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as well as conscientious objection.4 In some countries, there is no legal right to 
conscientiously object to performing abortions. In Sweden, for example, there 
is no right to conscientiously object to performing abortions.5 Gynaecologists 
and obstetricians, as well as nurses and administrative personnel, are expected 
to perform all their work duties in order to provide women with abortion before 
the 18th week of gestation, notwithstanding moral or religious objections.6 
Some individuals and organisations are questioning the aims of the Swedish 
regulation, and in early 2014, conscientious objection became a topic of interest 
in Sweden as a newly graduated midwife refused to perform abortions.7 
 
In other European countries, conscientious objection to performing abortions is 
a legal right. In these countries, healthcare providers may object to assisting or 
performing abortions, providing that they comply with the national legal provi-
sions relating to conscientious objection. An example of a country where effec-
tive access to abortion has been disregarded in favour of the right of healthcare 
providers to conscientiously object is Italy.8 In some regions of the country, 
more than 85 percent of the gynaecologists object to performing abortions, ac-
cording to national statistics. This practice creates significant difficulties for 
women to obtain a lawful abortion.9 
 
The contrasting environments in Italy and Sweden serve as an illustration of a 
phenomenon present all over Europe.10 This phenomenon consists of competing 
interests; the interest of a woman to receive lawful healthcare and the interest of 
the healthcare provider to follow his or her beliefs. These interests are, to dif-
ferent extents, protected under the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR, the Convention 
or the European Convention on Human Rights11). What protection these inter-
ests are awarded and how they are balanced against one another in the Council 
of Europe (hereinafter CoE or the Council) legal system is, therefore, an impor-
tant question. 
1.1 Purpose and Research Questions 
As illustrated above, the practice of conscientious objection is not unproblem-
atic. An unregulated use of conscientious objection to abortion may lead to a 
                                                 
4
 See different variations in regulation in chapters 3.3.1, 4.3.1 – 4.3.3. 
5
 The Swedish Abortion Act (1974:595) Sections 4 and 10. 
6
 The Swedish Abortion Act (1974:595) Sections 1 and 4. 
7
 Decision by the Swedish Equality Ombudsman (Complaints No. 2014/12 2014/226 
2014/227) 10 April 2014. 
8
 A more detailed account for conscientious objection and abortion in Italy is provided in 
chapter 5. 
9
 IPPF v. Italy (Complaint No. 87/2012) ECSR, 3 September 2012, paras. 82 and 169. 
10
 Zampas and Andión-Ibañez 2012, European Journal Of Health Law, p. 236. 
11
 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 1950, ETS 5. 
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situation where women’s legal right to effective access to reproductive health-
care no longer can be guaranteed. To assure effective protection of women’s 
access to lawful abortions, an examination of the scope and the limitation of the 
right to have access to lawful abortion within the Council of Europe context is 
necessary. It is, however, also important to establish the scope and limitation of 
conscientious objection to performing an abortion since some aspects of this 
practice are protected by the Convention. These aspects are important because 
states also have to protect these rights, especially if they have an absolute char-
acter.  
 
There is no clear answer to what extent the European Convention on Human 
Rights allows healthcare providers to conscientiously object to performing 
abortions. Nor is it clear to what extent the Convention provides protection for 
women’s access to a lawful abortion. As it seems, there is a small ‘gap’ in the 
Convention and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinaf-
ter ECtHR or the Court), which leaves the balancing of these two practices 
largely unregulated. However, there is still some guidance to be found in the 
Convention, in the case law of the Court and other instruments of the Council 
of Europe. The intention here is to narrow down the scope of this ‘gap’ with the 
help of named instruments. 
 
To examine the above, the focus of the thesis is the following questions: 
 
1. How are conscientious objection and access to abortion defined within 
the legal system of the Council of Europe? 
 
2. How does the Council of Europe balance the interests of objecting 
healthcare providers and women with legal abortion rights, when these 
interests collide? 
 
3. Does conscientious objection undermine legal abortion rights? If so, 
how is this demonstrated? 
1.2 Method and Material 
In order to answer the research questions I mainly use a rule-oriented approach, 
but also an interest- or problem-oriented approach. The interest- or problem-
oriented approach indicates a focus, not on one specific legal rule, but rather on 
the social phenomenon as a whole.12 The phenomenon of conscientious objec-
tion and its effect on access to lawful abortion spans across legal orders, both 
national and international, but also across several rules within the same legal 
order. Because of this, the interest- or problem-oriented approach is apt in the 
present framework. However, to be able to use this approach, it is necessary to 
identify and establish de lege lata in relation to the relevant interests. To estab-
lish and analyse if conscientious objection, as well as access to abortion, com-
                                                 
12
 Westberg 1992, p. 436. 
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ply with de lege lata within the Council of Europe, the rule-oriented, legal 
dogmatic method, is applied to the relevant provisions of the CoE legal instru-
ments.13 This means that the main sources of law, such as the provisions of the 
Convention and the judgements of the ECtHR, together with the secondary 
sources of law, such as law reference books and articles on the subject, are used 
to provide an understanding of de lege lata. 
 
In order to shed light on the legal ‘gap’ between conscientious objection and 
access to abortion within the Council of Europe system, a large number of 
European Court of Human Rights cases have been used throughout the thesis. 
In most of these cases, the information relevant to the present question have 
been extracted, but in six more relevant cases the merits are presented, and the 
cases are examined more thoroughly. I have chosen the cases because they are 
the most pertinent cases within the field; hence, they have not been chosen 
based on their geographic origin. 
 
To facilitate a better understanding of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, I have utilised articles and literature on the matter. Since there 
is little material addressing both conscientious objection to abortion and 
women’s access to abortion, I have to a large part utilised articles and literature 
which discuss either of the two. As there is a limited supply of Swedish mate-
rial regarding conscientious objection and access to abortion, the material is 
collected mainly from European and North American sources. Because the rea-
son for examining the regulation on conscientious objection is to investigate 
whether it can be allowed to limit women’s access to abortion, the material on 
conscientious objection has been extracted from Council of Europe publica-
tions, but also from critics of the practice. 
 
To further clarify the standpoint of the Council of Europe in the matter I have 
utilised resolutions from the Parliamentary Assembly (hereinafter PACE or the 
Assembly) and decisions of the European Committee of Social Rights (herein-
after ECSR or the Committee).14 Two recent cases from the ECSR have been 
examined in order to show national regulation on conscientious objection and 
abortion. One of these cases, a complaint against Italy, is used to show that 
conscientious objection can result in a lack of adequate reproductive health care 
in relation to women. Another case from the ECSR that has not yet been de-
cided, was initiated as a complaint against Sweden due to the country’s stance 
on the illegality of conscientious objection to abortion. Together these cases are 
used in order to show different aspects of the same issue and to highlight the 
issue by putting it into a specific context. The countries’ legislation on abortion 
and conscientious objection in the countries is examined in order to illustrate 
                                                 
13
 Westberg 1992, pp. 421, 427-436. 
14
 See more on these Council of Europe organs under section 1.3. 
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different legal techniques in the matter. As I speak both Italian and Swedish, I 
am able to take part of national legislation and literature from both countries. 
 
The field of research integrates to some extent the different areas of law, medi-
cine and ethics. The main scope is the legal regulation, but the other two fields 
are not without relevance for the thesis. This is reflected in the material, as a 
number of relevant articles are found in medical publications. 
1.3 Denomination and Delimitation 
The legal instruments and case law relevant for the study derive from the 
Council of Europe. The Council has its seat in Strasbourg and consists of six 
institutions and bodies with varying tasks.15 Three of these, namely the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, the Parliamentary Assembly and the European 
Committee of Social Rights, play different roles in this thesis. As the only judi-
cial human rights organ empowered to make legally binding judgments, the 
European Court of Human Rights provides interpretation of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.16  The European Committee of Social Rights has 
recently provided a decision on conscientious objection and access to abortion 
in Italy and is to provide yet another decision in a case against Sweden. 
Through two resolutions, the Parliamentary Assembly has provided CoE Mem-
ber States with recommendations regarding access to abortion and conscien-
tious objection. The three organs work in different ways, and as such, address 
the relevant issue differently. As a result, they complement each other and 
make it possible to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the subject. 
Legislation and case law of the European Union are excluded from the scope. 
Legislation from other international sources, such as the UN, is mentioned to 
put the rights mandated by the Council of Europe into context.  
 
Because one of the focal concerns of this thesis is the lack of access to legal 
abortion, it falls outside the scope of this thesis to examine the situation regard-
ing conscientious objection in countries where abortion is illegal. Having said 
this, the decisions and judgments of the ECtHR in which it evaluates the impor-
tance of access to abortion are remain relevant despite emanating from envi-
ronments in which abortion is illegal, because the decisions and judgments are 
still applicable to all the Member States of the Council of Europe. A compari-
son between countries where conscientious objection is legal versus countries 
where it is not legal provides an interesting comparison and shows variations 
on women’s access to abortion. Therefore, no CoE Member State is excluded 
from the scope of this thesis because of its stance on the legality or non-legality 
of conscientious objection. 
 
                                                 
15
 Evans and Silk 2013, p. 41. 
16
 San Giorgi 2012, p. 92. 
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At least two different concepts are used for the individual decision by health-
care providers not to provide contraceptives or to perform an abortion. These 
concepts are ‘conscientious objection’ and ‘conscientious refusal’. As ‘consci-
entious objection’ is the most recurring concept and the two concepts to a large 
extent are synonymous, I have chosen to utilise ‘conscientious objection’ for a 
more cohesive reading. ‘Conscientious objection’ also replaces the concept 
‘conscience clause’, which is often used to describe national legislation recog-
nising conscientious objection. When the word ‘law’ is used, it denotes national 
legislation in one or more of the Council of Europe Member States. As the per-
spective of this thesis is not limited to one specific country, I have chosen to 
utilise the expression ‘healthcare provider’ to describe those involved in the 
process of performing an abortion. This is because the distribution of responsi-
bilities in relation to the task of performing an abortion changes between differ-
ent countries as well as within different medical facilities. The professions in-
cluded in the concept ‘healthcare provider’ are, inter alia, obstetricians, mid-
wifes, gynaecologists, nurses, auxiliary nurses, administrative personnel and 
pharmacists. All of the above are in a position to hinder a woman from obtain-
ing an abortion through their conscientious objection and are therefore of rele-
vance for the thesis. Article 9 ECHR protects the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. As all the three freedoms are of importance to the con-
texts, they are at times joined in the expression freedom of belief. 
 
Within the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social 
Charter, there are several articles designed to protect different aspects of access 
to lawful abortion, primarily: 
 
o The right to life in Article 2 ECHR 
o The prohibition of torture in Article 3 ECHR 
o The right to a fair trial in Article 6 ECHR 
o The right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 ECHR 
o The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 9 
ECHR 
o The right to freedom of expression in Article 10 ECHR 
o The right to marry in Article 12 ECHR 
o The prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 ECHR 
o The right to protection of health in Article 11 ESC and as interpreted in 
Articles 3, 6, 8 and 14 of the ECHR17 
 
I have chosen to focus on three of these articles to be able to explore them ade-
quately: the right to respect for private life in Article 8, the right to freedom of 
expression in Article 10 ECHR and the right to protection of health in Article 
11 ESC. I have selected these articles based on the case law of the Court and 
                                                 
17
 Cf. chapter 4.1. 
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the decisions of the Committee, which show that these three articles have a 
particularly close connection to women’s access to lawful abortions. 
This thesis does not seek to discuss the moral permissibility or non-
permissibility of abortion, since the focus is on countries where abortion is le-
gal. For the same reason, it only addresses the question of the potential rights of 
the foetus in contexts where it is needed for the better understanding of the con-
text. Within the present scope, only public medical institutions are addressed as 
the employer of objecting healthcare providers. 
1.4 Outline 
The focus throughout this thesis is human rights within the Council of Europe 
system, interconnected with access to a lawful abortion or conscientious objec-
tion. Neither conscientious objection within the healthcare context, nor the right 
to abortion, is explicitly recognised in the European Convention on Human 
Rights or the European Social Charter (hereinafter ESC or the Charter). How-
ever, as the case law and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the European Committee of Social Rights reveal, there is protection for some 
aspects of conscientious objection, as well as some aspects of access to abortion 
within the CoE. What these aspects are and to what extent the Council of 
Europe system protects them is gradually revealed. 
 
Prior to entering the main part of the thesis, it is essential to have an under-
standing of which the relevant stakeholders are and their relation to one an-
other. There are in total three relevant interests affected by CoE legal regulation 
concerning accessibility to abortion and conscientious objection. Firstly, the 
interests of women with existing or prospective needs for abortion to receive 
the medical treatment to which they are legally entitled. Secondly, there is the 
objecting healthcare provider’s interest in a system that protects their prefer-
ence not to perform certain professional obligations. Thirdly, there is the state’s 
interest of acting in accordance with the European Convention on Human 
Rights and balancing the interests of its citizens. In addition to this, the state 
has an interest, as the employer of healthcare provider, in hiring medical staff 
that are capable of providing all medical care necessary, without discrimination, 
within their area of professional responsibility. Foreseeability is also a common 
interest of citizens when seeking medical care. Below in figure 1 is a schematic 
explanation of the relationships between the three relevant actors, the female 
citizen, the healthcare provider and the state. 
12 
 
 
Figure 1.  Schematic view of relevant interests in relation to conscientious ob-
jection to abortion. The right to abortion is established on a national level
18
, but 
is also protected under the human rights instruments of the Council of Europe. 
The practice of conscientious objection to abortion, on the other hand, is not ex-
plicitly recognised under the human rights instruments of the Council, but under 
certain circumstances it might gain protection from Article 9 ECHR.
19
 Note: 
Adapted from the European Convention on Human Rights and case law and doc-
trine referred in this thesis. 
 
The numbered arrows in Figure 1 show the different rights and obligations that 
need to be taken into account by the state. The citizen holds no obligations to-
wards the state in this matter, only the right to receive the medical care that the 
state should provide her with, according to national legislation.20 The healthcare 
provider, on the other hand, as a representative of the state, has an obligation 
towards both the state and the women seeking abortion services. In terms of the 
woman, the healthcare provider has an obligation to represent the state and pro-
vide legal abortion, unless there is a valid ground for conscientious objection in 
national legislation. In relation to the state, the healthcare provider has an obli-
gation to realise the services guaranteed by the state. As demonstrated by ar-
rows 3 and 5 in Figure 1, the healthcare provider also has a right (correspond-
ing to an obligation of the state) to enjoy the freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, which at times include conscientious objection.21 
 
                                                 
18
 Cf. chapter 3.1. 
19
 Zampas and Andión-Ibañez 2012, European Journal Of Health Law, p. 234. 
20
 See below in chapter 4 on Access to Lawful Abortion Services. 
21
 Cf. chapters 2 and 3. 
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If the interests of the healthcare provider interfere with the interests of the citi-
zen, the state has an obligation to balance their respective interests in order to 
fulfil its undertakings in relation to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.22 The practice of conscientious objection seems to be impeding 
women’s access to lawful abortions. Because of this, it is important to study the 
scope, but primarily the limits of conscientious objection. Hence, a large part of 
the thesis focus on what conscientious objection is, and under what circum-
stances healthcare providers are allowed to object to performing an abortion. 
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to conscientious objection and its relation to the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion of the Convention. The 
chapter also discusses the possibility of creating an analogy between conscien-
tious objection to compulsory military service and conscientious objection in a 
healthcare context. The next chapter is somewhat an extension of chapter 2, 
since its focus is also on conscientious objection. It also addresses situations 
where the practice of conscientious objection impedes the rights and freedoms 
of others. Chapter 3 also evinces the manner in which CoE Member States and 
the Court share the responsibility of balancing the named interests. 
 
When the limitations and the scope of conscientious objection have been de-
fined as far as possible, and the balancing between the different interests has 
been addressed, the following chapter, Chapter 4, is concerned with access to 
lawful abortion in a CoE context. It examines to what extent the legal instru-
ments of the CoE protect women’s right to access legal abortion services. It 
studies the right to protection of health, the right to respect for private life and 
the right to freedom of expression, mainly with the assistance of relevant case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights. Chapter 5 introduces Italy and 
Sweden as examples of the conflict between conscientious objection and access 
to abortion, while chapter 6 provides an analysis and conclusions on the is-
sue at hand. 
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2 Conscientious Objection 
Conscientious objectors frequently invoke Article 9 ECHR on the right to free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion to motivate their objection. Chapter 2 
mainly discusses whether the practice of conscientious objection falls within 
the ambit of Article 9 ECHR or not. As it is not clearly regulated in the Con-
vention or stated by the Court whether conscientious objectors in the healthcare 
field are entitled to protection as a human right, this chapter examines Article 9 
of the Convention and its provisions. One of its provisions is the freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs. This provision is examined in order to estab-
lish to what extent it corresponds with the traits of conscientious objection. 
 
Legal standards regulating conscientious objection in the healthcare setting are, 
as expressed by Christina Zampas and Ximena Andión-Ibañez in the European 
Journal of Health Law, inadequate in relation to the complexity of the prac-
tice.23 Because of the lack of regulation, this chapter also discusses whether it is 
possible to make an analogy between conscientious objection to compulsory 
military service and conscientious objection in a healthcare setting or not. The 
reason for this is that the Court has recognised a right to conscientiously object 
to compulsory military service in the case Bayatyan v. Armenia from 2011. 
2.1 Freedom of Thought, Conscience and 
Religion 
Few people would probably disagree that the freedom from state interference 
with the thought, conscience and religion of state citizens is a rudimentary 
component in a democratic society.24 Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention) safeguards these freedoms. In inter-
preting Article 9 ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights accentuates the 
fact that the main objective of the first paragraph of the article is to protect the 
right to hold any belief and the right to change that belief at any time. In rela-
tion to the freedom of religion, the European Court of Human Rights holds that 
“[r]eligious freedom is primarily a matter of individual thought and con-
science”.25 This is the notion known as the forum internum of Article 9 
ECHR.26 In order for a personal belief to qualify for the forum internum protec-
tion of the Convention, the belief has to attain a certain level of cogency, seri-
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 Zampas and Andión-Ibañez 2012, European Journal Of Health Law, p. 232. 
24
 Cf. ECtHR statements regarding the necessity of creating pluralism in a democratic soci-
ety; Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom (Application nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 
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ousness, cohesion, importance and an identifiable formal content.27 It is not 
enough to hold a mere thought or statement of belief. To that extent, personal 
belief qualifies for the forum internum aspect of Article 9 ECHR, and the Con-
vention protects this internal right as an absolute right.28 
2.2 A Relative Freedom to Manifest Beliefs 
Compared to the forum internum, the forum externum29, the right to manifest 
religion or belief, may affect other people as well as the state and this right is 
not absolute. The interests of others may, in accordance with Article 9 § 2 
ECHR, limit the exercise of acts or omissions with religious justification under 
certain conditions.30 This was the case in Pichon and Sajous v. France31, where 
the European Court of Human Rights did not allow two pharmacists to impose 
their religious belief on others, since they could manifest their belief in many 
ways outside the professional sphere. 
 
A central question is how an act or omission qualifies to become a manifesta-
tion of belief in the meaning of Article 9 ECHR. The previous definition was 
that if the act or omission was ‘intimately linked’ to a belief or faith, it qualified 
as a manifestation of said faith, and as such it could gain protection from the 
Convention. This definition typically comprised acts, which were “[…] aspects 
of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised form”32, such as 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.33 This definition is still in use, 
however, in one of its cases (the Eweida case described below34) the ECtHR 
established that manifestation of religion is not limited to these acts. As long as 
it is possible to establish a “sufficiently close and direct connection between an 
act or omission and the underlying belief”35, after careful consideration of the 
circumstances in each case, the act or omission may be defined as a manifesta-
tion of religion or belief within the definition of Article 9 ECHR.36 
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 Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom (Series A, No. 48)ECtHR Judgment of 25 
February 1982, para 36 and Renucci 2005, Human Rights Files, p. 12. 
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 See chapter 3.3.1. 
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2007, para. 57, Kalaç v. Turkey (Application no. 20704/92) ECtHR Judgment of 1 July 
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of 3 December 2009, p. 6 and Article 9 ECHR. 
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 The Eweida case is discussed in more detail in section 3.3.2. 
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51671/10 and 36516/10, Judgment of 25 May 2013, para. 82. 
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The breadth of the provision pertaining to the qualification of behaviour moti-
vated or influenced by religion or belief as a manifestation of said convictions, 
depends on how closely connected the behaviour and the belief are.37 In the 
above case, the Court has stated that: 
“[...]acts or omissions which do not directly express the belief con-
cerned or which are only remotely connected to a precept of faith fall 
outside the protection of Article 9 § 1”38. 
When applying these prerequisites to conscientious objection, there is no defi-
nite answer as to when conscientious objection might be defined as a manifesta-
tion of belief. This is dependent on the situation and is evaluated first hand by 
the state and second by the Court, if there is a case before it. Below is a sched-
ule showing a way to evaluate if an act or omission based on an underlying 
belief might constitute a manifestation of belief within the meaning of Article 9 
ECHR. 
 
 
Figure 2. Manifestation of belief. This schedule shows the way the ECtHR decides 
if a conscientious objection qualifies as a manifestation of belief in the meaning of 
Article 9 ECHR, and what limitations the ECtHR allows the state to impose on a 
manifestation of belief. Note: Adapted from the case Eweida and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, Article 9 ECHR and Arai-Takahashi 2002, pages 2, 8, 9, 12, 
219, 220 and 231. 
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The conscientious objection of a healthcare provider that meet the requirements 
to be defined as a manifestation of belief might receive protection from Article 
9 ECHR on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, but as shown in Fig-
ure 2 above, it may also be subject to limitations.39 According to Article 9 § 2 
ECHR manifestation of belief can be derogated against inter alia in regard to 
protection of health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as 
long as the limitation is “prescribed by law” and is “necessary in a democratic 
society”.40 The corollary being that it might be possible to limit the right to 
conscientiously object in states where there is a legal right to abortion, as long 
as the right to abortion is “prescribed by law” and is “necessary in a democratic 
society”. These concepts are described further in the chapter on the State Mar-
gin of Appreciation.41  
2.3 A Comparison of Conscientious 
Objection in Two Different Fields 
This section provides an idea of what protection the Convention offers consci-
entious objectors in two different fields, the military and the healthcare context. 
The reason for a comparison to the military is that this is the only context in 
which conscientious objection has been explicitly recognised by the Court and 
in which it has gained protection by the Convention. 
 
Nothing within the European Convention on Human Rights expressly grants an 
individual the right to conscientiously object.42 However, even if there is no 
explicit right, the Court may interpret a protection in the Convention, because it 
is a living instrument that is adaptable to a changing consensus within the CoE. 
This is known as an “evolutive interpretation” of the Convention.43 
 
In Bayatyan v. Armenia from 201144, the European Court of Human Rights 
examined the issue of the applicability of Article 9 ECHR to conscientious ob-
jectors within the military. The reason to include this case is purely because this 
is the only case where the European Court of Human Rights has explicitly rec-
ognised a right to conscientiously object. It is however important to keep in 
mind that this case concerns conscientious objection within the military which 
is very different from conscientious objection in a healthcare setting. 
 
In this case, the European Court of Human Rights recognised the right to con-
scientiously object to performing compulsory military service. Prior to this 
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Judgment of 7 July 2011. 
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case, it was only clear that Article 9 ECHR offered protection to the forum in-
ternum, but not whether this also applied to the forum externum or not.45 In 
Bayatyan v. Armenia, the European Court of Human Rights articulated that 
certain cases of manifestations against compulsory military service might at-
tract the guarantees of Article 9 ECHR on freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. 
2.3.1 Bayatyan v. Armenia 
In the Bayatyan v. Armenia case, the applicant, who was a member of Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses, conscientiously objected against partaking in the mandatory 
military service of Armenia with reference to his religious beliefs.46 The appli-
cant made known to the authorities that he would prefer to serve within an al-
ternative civil service instead. However, contrary to most Council of Europe 
Member States, Armenia did not offer an alternative civilian service as a substi-
tute to the compulsory military service at the time.47 
 
Upon the accession to the Council of Europe, the Armenian state committed to 
adopting a law making alternative service available for conscientious objectors. 
48 Until the enactment of that law, the state also undertook to pardon all objec-
tors from their prison or service sentences and allow them to perform an alter-
native civilian service instead.49 The law had not been enacted yet and discor-
dant with the latter commitment, Bayatyan was prosecuted and convicted for 
his refusal to partake in the military service.50  He alleged that “his conviction 
for refusal to serve in the army had violated his right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.”51 
 
The European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) was until 1998 
a part of the system ensuring state observance of the ECHR.52 The Commission 
had several opportunities to examine the issue of conscientious objection in 
relation to military service. It repeatedly reaffirmed in its case law that there 
was no right to conscientious objection among the rights and freedoms guaran-
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teed by the Convention.53 The Commission based this reasoning on the exis-
tence of Article 4 § 3 (b) of the Convention and the fact that there is no explicit 
right to conscientious objection in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Article 4 § 3 (b) ECHR excludes from the notion of forced labour54 “any ser-
vice of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries 
where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military ser-
vice”.55 The Commission argued that by adding the words “in countries where 
they are recognised”56, the Convention left a choice to the High Contracting 
Parties whether or not to recognise conscientious objectors. It follows from this 
argumentation that Article 9 ECHR, as qualified by Article 4 § 3 (b), does not 
impose an obligation on the states to acknowledge conscientious objectors or to 
“make special arrangements for the exercise of their right to freedom of con-
science and religion as far as it [affects] their compulsory military service”57. 
As a result, a state that does not acknowledge the right to conscientiously object 
would have the right to punish citizens for refusing to do military service.58 If 
applied to the case of Bayatyan v. Armenia, this would mean that imprisoning 
the applicant would be lawful and would not result in damages for the state. 
 
The later reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights, however, differs 
from the reasoning of the Commission.59 The European Court of Human Rights 
contends that Article 4 § 3 (b) neither recognises nor excludes a right to consci-
entious objection. Because of this, it argues that the article should not have a 
limiting effect on the exercise of the rights under Article 9 ECHR.60 The Court 
contended that the reasoning by the Commission, excluding the possibility to 
conscientiously object to compulsory military service from the scope of Article 
9 ECHR, was obsolete. It was obsolete because the development of the interna-
tional and domestic perspectives on refusing mandatory military service shifted 
substantially after the Commission’s last decision on the matter in 1995.61 
 
Despite the fact that the Convention holds no explicit right to conscientious 
objection, the European Court of Human Rights argued in Bayatyan v. Armenia 
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that conscientious objection could attract the protection of Article 9 ECHR. A 
prerequisite for this was that the belief behind the objection constituted a belief 
of sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to motivate an 
objection to compulsory military service.62 The objection also had to be moti-
vated by: 
[...] a serious and insurmountable conflict between the obligation to 
serve in the army and a person’s conscience or his deeply and genu-
inely held religious or other beliefs [emphasis added]”63  
Notwithstanding this view, the Court clarified that the assessment regarding the 
qualification under these provisions needs to be done in consideration of the 
special circumstances of the particular case.64 In this case the Court argued that 
the Armenian state failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of society 
as a whole and the interests of the individual by not providing an alternative 
civil service as a substitute to the compulsory military service and by prosecut-
ing and convicting the applicant.65 It considered that the applicant, instead of 
sharing the societal burden and fulfilling an alternative civil service had to 
serve a prison sentence.66 This penalty could not be considered a measure nec-
essary in a democratic society.67 
2.3.2 An Analogy to the Healthcare Context 
The above gives an account of the prerequisites to gain the right to conscien-
tiously object to compulsory military service. This is the only area in which 
conscientious objection has been internationally recognised and the only area in 
which it to some extent has earned protection as a human right. Apart from the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also recognises conscientious 
objection against performing obligatory military service.68 There is, however, 
no similar right established within the healthcare field.69 
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One could argue that it is possible to make an analogy between conscientious 
objection in the military and conscientious objection in a healthcare context.70 
However, conscientious objection towards compulsory obligations that a state 
forces upon its citizens is substantially different from conscientious objection 
against performing work tasks within an employment into which the employee 
has entered on a voluntary basis. Even though it might have significant conse-
quences to resign from a job in order to fully be able to manifest one’s beliefs71, 
it is not equal to being forced into a job, which might also entail coercion to 
exert deadly violence, and where it is impossible to resign. Due to the said na-
ture of the work as well as the degree of state interference, the result in Bayatan 
v. Armenia can be distinguished from conscientious objection in a healthcare 
setting in a number of ways. Primarily because a healthcare provider is not co-
erced to train to become a doctor or midwife or forced to work in a setting 
where he or she has to perform abortions. 
 
Another difference is that if an individual refuses to perform mandatory mili-
tary service, the refusal does not directly infringe the human rights or access to 
human rights of others. If everyone refused to partake in mandatory military 
service, those refusals would, quite oppositely, result in less harm to others. 
Within the healthcare field, the ramifications could be different. If a medical 
doctor decides to refuse to provide a woman with an abortion or information 
regarding abortion due to conscientious conviction and if there at the same time 
are no other healthcare providers to perform the procedure, it infringes her ac-
cess to lawful medical care. In these cases, a woman is directly affected if a 
healthcare provider chooses not to assist her, since there is no other way for her 
to obtain a lawful abortion.  
 
The ratio decidendi of Bayatyan v. Armenia was that the High Contracting 
Parties to the Convention may no longer prosecute a conscientious objector on 
the grounds of the objection, in case the refusal is genuine72 and if he or she 
wishes to perform an alternative civilian service as a substitute for regular mili-
tary service.73 The Court argued that in not providing a substitute civilian ser-
vice, the Armenian state failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of 
society as a whole and those of the applicant within its margin of appreciation. 
There is no indication that the European Court of Human Rights would have 
allowed someone to conscientiously object towards performing the substitute 
civilian service. In fact, Article 4 § 3 (b) ECHR74 states the exact opposite. A 
conscientious objector that refuses to perform alternative civilian service in a 
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country where that possibility is offered cannot rely on the protection of the 
Convention.75 This shows that even if conscientious objection might be recog-
nised by the Council of Europe in matters concerning objection to perform 
compulsory military service, there are limitations to the scope of this right, just 
as it would be with a recognised right to conscientious objection within any 
other field. That limitation serves to protect the interest of the state and the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
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3 Conscientious Objection and 
Opposing Interests 
The previous chapter gave rise to a number of questions in relation to when a 
conscientious objection can be classified as a manifestation of belief. The case 
of Bayatyan v. Armenia showed that there is a right to conscientiously object to 
compulsory military service and that this right gains protection from the Con-
vention under specific circumstances. This, however, does not answer the ques-
tion of the status of conscientious objection in the healthcare context, seeing 
that this context automatically provides an opposed interest to that of the objec-
tor. This question has not been answered directly by the Convention and only 
partly by the Court. Hence, in order to answer this question, other principles of 
the Court and recommendations from other institutions of the Council of 
Europe are examined in this chapter. The principle of ‘margin of appreciation’ 
gives good guidance in showing how conflicts between competing interests are 
usually resolved within the Council. Policy decisions from another organ of the 
CoE, the Parliamentary Assembly, show recommendations given to the Mem-
ber States of the CoE in the matter. 
3.1 The State Margin of Appreciation 
When comparing rights to one another, as in the context of conscientious objec-
tion and access to lawful abortion, there must be a method of  prioritising the 
two. This ranking is made primarily by the CoE Member States, within their 
margin of appreciation, but also by the European Court of Human Rights, if the 
alleged victim of human rights violations by said states brings a case to the 
Court. The margin of appreciation is the scope of freedom CoE Member States 
enjoy when they are fulfilling their obligations under the Convention.76 
 
This freedom includes the possibility for a state to restrict and balance the 
rights of its citizens. However, states do not have a margin of appreciation in 
relation to every single right in the Convention. There are absolute rights that 
cannot be derogated from, and in relation to those rights, the Strasbourg organs 
have refused to recognise a margin of appreciation.77 An example of such a 
right is the right to freedom from torture in Article 3 ECHR.  
In cases concerning the morals of state citizens and in cases where there is no 
clear consensus between the CoE Member States, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has expressed that the Member States enjoy a wide discretion in 
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balancing the Convention rights involved.78 For example, the Court stated in 
the case Vo. V. France that there was no European consensus on the scientific 
and legal definition of when life begins.79 Hence, the question of when life be-
gins, and therefore the question whether the right to life under Article 2 ECHR 
applies to the foetus or not, falls within the states’ margin of appreciation.80 
 
Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, who has analysed the margin of appreciation in the 
case law of the Court in detail81, alleges that the Court has specifically recog-
nised a margin of appreciation in three contexts. These circumstances are ‘cases 
involving certain specified rights and freedoms’, in relation to ‘non-
discrimination’ under Article 14 ECHR and with regards to ‘derogation under a 
state of emergency’ under Article 15 ECHR.82 The rights relevant in this con-
text are included in the group ‘certain specified rights and freedoms’ and com-
prise of the right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 ECHR, the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 9 ECHR and the 
right to freedom of expression in Article 10 ECHR.83 
 
In these three articles, there are limitation clauses within their second para-
graphs. When the ECtHR has found an interference with the right expressed in 
the Article, the interference has to be examined in relation to three standards in 
these limitation clauses. The three standards are as follows: that the state inter-
ference has to be ‘prescribed by law’, it has to pursue a ‘legitimate aim’84 and it 
has to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. It is the third standard that is most 
relevant when it comes to the margin of appreciation. Arai-Takahashi holds that 
in order to be necessary in a democratic society, the reasons for the interference 
must be both ‘relevant and sufficient’ as well as representing a ‘pressing social 
need’.85 The fact that the state interference to an individual right has to be mo-
tivated by a pressing social need means that it must be proportionate in relation 
to the legitimate aim pursued. It is in relation to the proportionality and in de-
ciding if there is a pressing social need that the states are provided with a mar-
gin of appreciation. 86 
 
In relation to rights where states have a margin of appreciation, the state must 
consider the fact that the breadth of the margin may differ from time to time, 
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depending on the nature of the right that has been restricted by the state and the 
aim of the restriction.87 For instance, in regards to the right to respect for pri-
vate and family life in Article 8 ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights 
has stated that where state limitations affect “[the] most intimate part of an in-
dividual’s private life”88 states need a particularly serious reason in order to 
strike a balance that interferes with the said right.89 
 
States generally enjoy a broad margin of appreciation with regards to abortion, 
which means that it is for the state to decide if it should be legal or not, and to 
define in which circumstances it should be allowed.90 However, once a state has 
decided to legalise abortion, the state is obliged to ensure that the national legal 
framework is in accordance with the obligations emanating from the Conven-
tion.91 In relation to Article 9 the states generally enjoy a wide margin of appre-
ciation as well.92 Because of this, Mark Campbell argues in an article in Medi-
cal Law International that the ECtHR should award states a wide margin of 
appreciation in applying Article 9 in cases where conscientious objection has 
been invoked.93 
 
Even if a certain matter is generally within the state’s discretion and a state has 
evaluated the proportionality of an infringement in relation to a pressing social 
need, the European Court of Human Rights may still scrutinise the state’s de-
liberation when striking a balance between Convention rights. For example, the 
Court stated in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland that a state’s 
balancing of rights with regards to the protection of morals within its margin of 
appreciation is not unreviewable. Thus, restrictions or penalties imposed on 
citizens may be subject to the European Court of Human Rights’ supervision 
even if the question per se is within a state’s margin of appreciation.94 
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However, Arai-Takahashi stresses, that the doctrine of the margin of apprecia-
tion has been criticised.95 One such criticism is that there is no substantive basis 
for the margin of appreciation in the Convention. Another more alarming cri-
tique is whether or not the application of the doctrine is compatible with the 
notion of human rights. As the essence of human rights is that individual rights 
should be protected against the main subjects of public international law, the 
states, it is considered contradictory that there is a doctrine limiting this right.96  
 
Another aspect of the margin of appreciation that has been criticised is the fact 
that there are no express rules on its application and because of this, the appli-
cation has been considered inconsistent and unforeseeable.97 This creates a 
problem in relation to the rights discussed in the context of this thesis since it 
makes it hard, if not impossible, to foresee to what extent those rights are under 
the supervision of the Court, and to what extent they are under the supervision 
of the states within their margin of appreciation. 
3.2 Policy Decisions  
As established in the previous section, CoE Member States usually enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation in striking a fair balance between competing Con-
vention rights, such as conscientious objection if it qualifies as a manifestation 
under Article 9 ECHR and women’s right to lawful abortions under Articles 8 
and 10 ECHR and 11 ESC. In this balancing of interests, the states may take 
advice from other CoE institutions. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe provides advice or policy decisions that can serve as guidelines for 
the Member States.98 The Statute of the PACE refers to these policy decisions 
or advice as recommendations. The Assembly can also communicate these rec-
ommendations in the form of resolutions.99 These recommendations or resolu-
tions are proposals aimed to be implemented by national governments at will100 
and are not legally binding to states.101 
 
Two Resolutions of the PACE that are regularly referred to in relation to con-
scientious objection and access to lawful abortion are Resolution 1607 (2008) 
Access to safe and legal abortion in Europe and Resolution 1763 (2010) The 
right to conscientious objection in lawful medical care. Their perspective on 
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the issue differs, but they both establish that a conscientious objection should 
not hinder real access to lawful abortion. Since resolutions from the PACE are 
not legally binding to CoE states, the two Resolutions do not oblige Council of 
Europe Member States to act. Because of the advisory function of the Assem-
bly, its recommendations may however have a persuasive impact on the reason-
ing of the CoE Member States. 
 
Resolution 1607 (2008) Access to safe and legal abortion in Europe calls on 
Council of Europe Member States to inter alia guarantee women’s effective 
exercise of their right to safe and legal abortion and to remove restrictions that 
hinder de jure and de facto access to abortion. The Resolution also recommends 
the CoE Member States to provide access to affordable contraception for men 
and women and to provide comprehensive sexuality education for young peo-
ple.102 
 
In addition to this, the Resolution points out that the lack of healthcare provid-
ers that are willing to carry out lawful abortions might affect women’s effective 
access to safe, affordable, acceptable and appropriate abortion services in the 
Member States.103 
 
A concern of the Assembly is that many of the Member States impose condi-
tions upon the access to lawful abortion services, with the effect of restricting 
the access to legal abortions. According to the Assembly, the provisions im-
posed by the Member States could have a discriminatory effect amongst 
women, making it easier for women with access to information and sufficient 
financial means to obtain legal and safe abortions.104 In the Resolution, the As-
sembly: “[...] affirms the right of all human beings, in particular women, to 
respect for their physical integrity and to freedom to control their own bodies. 
In this context, the ultimate decision on whether or not to have an abortion 
should be a matter for the woman concerned, who should have the means of 
exercising this right in an effective way.”105 However, the Assembly also points 
out that there is a need to reduce the number of induced abortions and that that 
the procedure is not to be used as a method of family planning.106 
 
Resolution 1763 The right to conscientious objection in lawful medical care 
consists of four paragraphs and aim to encourage states to ensure women’s ac-
cess to lawful medical care and the right to health in parallel with the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion of a healthcare provider. The Par-
liamentary Assembly invite Council of Europe Member States to secure the 
right to conscientious objection in relation to abortion. However, the language 
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in the resolution suggests that, apart from individuals, hospitals and institutions 
should also hold the right to conscientiously object. The European Commission 
on Human Rights has clarified that hospitals and institutions are not entitled to 
enjoy the right to freedom of conscience under Article 9 ECHR as this is an 
individual right. Established human rights, therefore, run contrary to this propo-
sition.107 
 
The main objective of the Resolution is to strike a balance between an option 
for healthcare providers to conscientiously object and the right to access lawful 
medical care. In Paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly 
expresses its concern that “...the unregulated use of conscientious objection 
may disproportionately affect women, notably those with low incomes or living 
in rural areas”108. This indicates that it is mainly in regards to women’s interest 
to access their legally granted rights that the resolution seeks to establish a 
clearly regulated use of conscientious objection. 
 
Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly recommends Member States to en-
sure that patients receive information in a timely manner when a health-care 
provider has conscientiously refused to treat a patient. It also invites the states 
to ensure that patients receive appropriate treatment in all situations, but par-
ticularly in situations of emergency.109 
3.3 Opposing Interests and the European 
Court of Human Rights 
This subchapter examines two cases from the European Court of Human Rights 
where conscientious objection is one component, and the opposing interest of 
others who are affected by the refusal is the other. The cases also have in com-
mon that the conscientious objector was in his or her professional role when 
objecting. The first case, Pichon and Sajous v. France concerned two pharma-
cists who conscientiously objected to selling legal contraceptives to three 
women. The second case, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, con-
cerned four applications, two of which are of relevance for this context. The 
issue in these two cases was that the applicants refused to provide same-sex 
couples with partnership ceremonies and psychosexual therapy.110 
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3.3.1 Pichon and Sajous v. France 
The case Pichon and Sajous v. France111 is of interest because it provided the 
ECtHR with an opportunity to evaluate the applicability of Article 9 ECHR on 
conscientious objection within the sphere of healthcare. Hence, the Court had to 
evaluate the balance struck by the Government between the competing inter-
ests. 
 
The application concerned conscientious objection by two pharmacists refusing 
to sell contraceptives to three women with reference to religious conviction. 
The pharmacists claimed under Article 9 ECHR to the European Court of Hu-
man Rights that their refusal amounted to a manifestation of religion and that 
their right to freedom of religion was not given fair consideration during the 
national trial.112  
 
The European Court of Human Rights found that the conviction of the pharma-
cists did not interfere with their exercise of the rights under Article 9 ECHR, 
and the application was, therefore, ill-founded in the meaning of Article 35 § 3 
ECHR and the Court declared it inadmissible.113 This means that even though 
the applicants refused to sell the prescribed contraceptives on the grounds of 
their religious belief, the European Court of Human Rights did not recognise 
their omission to sell contraceptives as a manifestation of religion within the 
meaning of Article 9 ECHR.114 
 
In the rationale behind this decision, the Court reiterated that the protection of 
Article 9 mainly serves to protect the forum internum. It also stated that, apart 
from the different ways of manifesting one’s religion or belief listed in Article 
9, the Convention might safeguard other ways of showing one’s belief. How-
ever, not every act of conscience draws protection from the Convention, be-
cause “[t]he word ‘practice’ used in Article 9 § 1 does not denote each and 
every act or form of behaviour motivated or inspired by a religion or a be-
lief”.115 
 
The European Court of Human Rights was not very clear on why the refusal did 
not qualify as a manifestation of religion under Article 9, but the reasoning of 
the decision might still give us some guidance. The Court argued inter alia that 
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pharmacists, as sole providers of contraceptives on medical prescription, 
“...cannot give precedence to their religious beliefs and impose them on others 
as justification for their refusal to sell such products, since they can manifest 
those beliefs in many ways outside the professional sphere.”116 In this case the 
ECtHR let professional duties prevail in order to protect the legal right to ac-
cess contraceptives. 
 
In Pichon and Sajous the conscientious objection did not meet the requirements 
to qualify as a manifestation of religion under Article 9 ECHR and as a result of 
this, the objection did not qualify as a human right within the meaning of the 
ECHR. The question is if the Convention in a different situation, like when a 
healthcare provider refuses to perform an abortion, would provide a right to 
conscientiously object within the healthcare context, or if competing rights and 
freedoms of others would prevail because it is a legitimate aim in that situation 
as well. It is not possible to draw any lengthy conclusions from one admissibil-
ity decision, but the decision may indicate some unwillingness of the ECtHR to 
address conscientious objections in relation to healthcare. 
3.3.2 Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom 
The ECtHR saw the opportunity to clarify a number of previously hidden prin-
ciples in the case Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom.117 The judgment 
not only addressed the situation of the four applicants, but also provided a new 
way of interpreting Article 9 ECHR.118 The Eweida case meant a clear depar-
ture from the jurisprudence of the previous European Commission of Human 
Rights119. In Eweida and Others the European Court of Human Rights evalu-
ated the national courts’ proportionality assessment regarding the right of four 
British citizens to express their belief in the workplace. Two of the applicants 
complained that they were not allowed to show religious symbols in the work-
place, and the other two applicants had conscientiously objected to providing 
partnership ceremonies for same-sex couples and providing psychosexual ther-
apy to same-sex couples.120  
 
Concerning the two applicants conscientiously objecting to providing services 
to same-sex couples, the ECtHR had to evaluate whether their behaviours con-
stituted manifestations of religion. In this context, the Court has implemented a 
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new set of rules in order to define a manifestation of belief. Previously an act or 
omission had to be intimately linked to a belief or faith to qualify as a manifes-
tation of belief. This created a narrow scope for qualification as a manifestation 
of belief and entailed “aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a gener-
ally recognised form”121, such as worship, teaching, practice and observance.122 
In Eweida and Others, the Court applied a broader interpretation of manifesta-
tion of religion, calling for a sufficiently close and direct connection between an 
act or omission and the underlying belief.123 
 
This altered the interference test previously applied in the ECtHR and it means 
that the applicant does not need to be in conformity with religious doctrines in 
order to qualify for protection.124 This change might entail a better protection 
for minorities within religious groups. 
 
The broader scope applied by the Court in the present case made it possible for 
it to conclude that the two applicants’ conscientious objection towards provid-
ing services to same-sex couples constituted behaviours that qualified as a 
manifestation of belief. Hence, they also qualified for protection under Article 9 
ECHR.125  
Another break with the previous jurisprudence was the so-called ‘free-contract 
doctrine’126, reiterated by the Commission in several of its decisions. The free-
contract doctrine meant that when an employee voluntarily had accepted to 
follow the provisions of a workplace, they could not complain that those rules 
limited their freedom to manifest their religion, because they were free to re-
sign from the job and change employment. The free-contract doctrine worked 
as a filter, preventing employee’s from contending that there had been an inter-
ference with their religious freedom in the workplace.127 In Eweida and others, 
the ECtHR changed approach. The possibility to resign and find another em-
ployment no longer works as a barrier to Article 9 ECHR. However, it is still a 
factor that should be weighed into the proportionality assessment.128 A signifi-
cant change expressed by the Court in the Eweida and Others case, was the fact 
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that the possibility to resign from a job, or change workplace should be 
weighed into the Court’s assessment of proportionality rather than its assess-
ment of interference.129  
 
In the proportionality assessment regarding the two applicants, weighing in 
their favour was the fact that they had both lost their jobs due to their religious 
convictions. In addition to this, one of the applicants was not hired to provide 
same-sex partnership ceremonies but had this task introduced on a later date. 
Against the two applicants, stood the aim of the authorities to secure the rights 
and freedoms of others under the Convention.130 Another fact that detracted 
from their chance of receiving protection from Article 9 ECHR, was the fact 
that one of the applicants specifically had sought out the role as a psychosexual 
counsellor, knowing that there was a policy on equal treatment in relation to 
services with which he had to comply.131 Another significant diminishment was 
the fact that the state had not decided in their favour with regards to their con-
scientious objection. Given that the Court generally allows the national authori-
ties a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to striking a balance between 
competing Convention rights, it fell within the state margin of appreciation to 
weight the opposing interests against one another. In the Eweida and Others 
case, the Court did not consider that there had been a violation of the right to 
freedom of religion in relation to the two objecting applicants. The main reason 
for this was the fact that the action by the national authorities was intended to 
secure the implementation of its policy of providing services without discrimi-
nation and in doing so, protecting the rights and freedoms of others.132 
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4 Access to Lawful Abortion 
Services 
Compared to the focus on conscientious objection in the previous chapters, this 
chapter addresses the right to access lawful abortion in the Council of Europe 
Member States. The previous chapters showed that the practice of conscien-
tious objection in the healthcare context is far from an established right under 
the legal instruments of the Council of Europe. They showed that there are dis-
tinct criteria that need to be satisfied in order for an action or omission to qual-
ify as a manifestation of religion in relation to Article 9 ECHR. Even then, it is 
hard for a conscientious objector to abortion to gain protection from the Con-
vention since there are opposing interests that justify interferences with the 
right to manifest freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
 
This chapter shows that the right to abortion, at the present time, cannot be de-
rived from the Convention, despite a broad consensus among majority of the 
Contracting States to allow abortion at least in relation to grounds of health and 
well-being.133 By contrast, it also shows that the European Court of Human 
Rights repeatedly emphasises the importance of access to abortion in Member 
States where this is a legal right. This means that the Court interprets a right to 
access lawful abortion under the Convention and that the Member States of the 
Council of Europe that have a legal right to abortion are obliged to provide 
these services in an effective and accessible manner. 
 
Three human rights of the Convention and the Charter with significant rele-
vance to the context are studied to provide an understanding of access to lawful 
abortion in the Council of Europe Context. First, the chapter provides an over-
view of the regulation on the right to access health and healthcare in the Con-
vention and Article 11 of the Charter, which is the overarching right in relation 
to access to abortion. Second, it provides insight into the right to impart and 
receive information regarding abortion under Article 10 ECHR on the right to 
freedom of expression, since this is a fundamental right which is necessary for 
individuals to be able exchange information on abortion. Third, it discusses 
access to abortion in relation to the right to respect for private life under Article 
8 ECHR, which is currently the most central provision of the Convention in 
relation to access to abortion. Each of these rights is closely connected to the 
other and together they form the main framework regarding access to abortion 
within the Council of Europe context. In connection to these rights, the chapter 
points out a number of critical variables, such as the limited time available in 
                                                 
133
 The Court has pointed out that it is possible to obtain an abortion on health and well-
being grounds in approximately 40 out of 47 Contracting States. A, B and C v. Ireland 
(Application no. 25579/05) ECtHR Judgment of 16 December, para. 235. 
34 
 
relation to abortion procedures and the need of access to effective procedures to 
establish whether a woman has a right to abortion in a specific setting. First, a 
basic model showing the overlap between access to a lawful abortion and con-
scientious objection is provided. 
 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the effect of conscientious objection on women’s access 
to lawful abortion, in a country where both abortion and conscientious objec-
tion towards abortion is legal. Women’s right to access abortion is in most 
cases (main part of circle 1) not affected by the conscientious objection of 
healthcare providers. However, as demonstrated by the symbol X in the figure, 
there are cases when, due to conscientious objection, women are not able to 
obtain the medical care that they are legally entitled to. Situation X occurs 
when healthcare providers conscientiously objects, lawfully or unlawfully, to 
provide women with lawful abortions, if, at the same time, there is no one else 
to perform the abortion.134 Thus, situation X symbolises situations where 
women have no actual access to abortion services, despite a legal right to these 
services. Rebecca J. Cook et al. hold that in cases where law conflict with indi-
viduals’ perception of morals and ethics, citizens’ perception of ethics com-
monly prevails as the law is undermined if not obeyed and respected. As ex-
pressed by the authors: “Law frames the setting within which ethical choices 
may be practically exercised, but ethics frames the limits within which law is 
voluntarily obeyed and respected as an expression of the values and aspirations 
of the society in which it applies.”135 However, it is questionable if healthcare 
providers’ perception of moral and ethics in relation to abortion motivates re-
fraining from applying democratically made laws. 
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4.1 The Right to Health 
The right to health addresses the conflict illustrated above in relation to 
women’s access to lawful abortion services. It recognises the right to access 
health and healthcare. The human rights to health and healthcare are firmly 
incorporated in international human rights law.136 States have to realise the 
scopes of these two rights to the maximum level possible, in relation to state 
resources. However, the rights to health and healthcare have a core content that 
is not subject to derogations and limitations. The core content of a right com-
prises of the minimum entitlement under its scope.137 States are under a direct 
obligation to realise the core contents of these rights. The core contents of the 
rights to health and healthcare encompass the equal and non-discriminatory 
access to healthcare.138 The question is the significance in relation to access to 
abortion and how the above rights are protected within the Council of Europe 
system. 
 
In the Council of Europe system, an explicit right to health is found in Article 
11 of the European Social Charter139 on the right to protection of health. The 
Committee emphasised in 2012 that Article 11 ESC puts a positive obligation 
on CoE Member States to provide appropriate and timely reproductive health-
care on a non-discriminatory basis.140 The Committee also emphasised that 
healthcare systems that do not provide for the specific health needs of women 
necessarily violates Article 11 ESC or Article 11 in conjunction with Article E 
of the Charter.141 
 
Furthermore, an information document prepared by the secretariat of the Euro-
pean Social Charter stresses that the national systems of healthcare need to be 
accessible to the entire population, as a basic human right, without discrimina-
tion.142 The Secretariat also holds that the right to access to healthcare means, 
inter alia, that the costs for the healthcare should not be born exclusively by the 
individual and that the number of healthcare providers and the access to health-
care equipment should be adequate. It also highlights that preparatory work to 
arrange access to healthcare should not delay the implementation of this right. 
In relation to state citizens, all treatment should be based on transparent crite-
ria and agreed at a national level.143 Applied to abortion, this means that the 
criteria used by healthcare providers or national courts in order to decide 
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whether a woman qualifies for an abortion should be predictable and clear to 
the national population. 
 
There is no equivalent, explicit right to health under the Convention. However, 
because the European Court of Human Rights is the only judicial human rights 
body that can make legally binding decisions and judgments144, it would make 
a difference if the Court could interpret a right to health within the Convention. 
 
The Court indicated in 1979 that there is no sharp line between the civil and 
political rights on one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the 
other hand. The Court has substantiated its jurisprudence on economic, social 
and cultural rights (ESC-rights) from the rights laid down in the Charter.145 The 
Court has now addressed fundamental questions concerning economic, social 
and cultural rights and clarified the responsibilities of CoE Member States in 
relation to these rights.146 
 
The Court used several articles of the Convention to confer protection to the 
ESC-rights. The articles most frequently used are: Article 3 on the prohibition 
of torture and degrading treatment; Article 8 on the right to respect for private 
and family life; Article 6 on the right to a fair trial and these rights in conjunc-
tion with Article 14 on the prohibition on discrimination.147 
 
For example, in the case Boso v. Italy148, a man contended that his partner’s 
abortion constituted a breach of the right to life149 of the foetus and his right to 
family life under Article 8 ECHR.150 The Court held that the Italian law aimed 
to protect the health of the woman in relation to an abortion and that this law 
struck a fair balance between the woman’s interests and the state’s interest of 
protecting the foetus. Therefore, the state had not gone beyond its margin of 
appreciation when dismissing Boso’s complaints. This case, among others, 
illustrates the Court’s tendency to evaluate cases related to abortion under Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention from a view of health.151 
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4.2 The Freedom to Receive and Impart 
Information on Abortion 
Access to abortion in relation to the right to health was addressed in the previ-
ous section, which among other things showed that the Contracting States to the 
ESC need to provide healthcare addressed to women’s specific needs in order 
to comply with the Charter. This subchapter introduces the right to freedom of 
expression in relation to abortion. In order to comprehend the Court’s stance in 
this matter, the case Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland152 is exam-
ined. 
 
Without general access to information on abortion, there is a risk that especially 
citizens with less informational or financial resources might not be able to ob-
tain an abortion even if they have the legal right to it.153 The question is what 
obligation Council of Europe Member States have to protect freedom of ex-
pression with regards to reproductive health. In the ECtHR case Open Door and 
Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, exactly this question was addressed. To be 
more precise, the right to receive and impart information concerning abortion 
was addressed.154 
 
The applicants of the case were two non-profit companies, Open Door Counsel-
ling Ltd (hereinafter Open Door155) and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd (here-
inafter Dublin Well), as well as two counsellors working at Dublin Well, Ms 
Maher and Ms Downes. The two companies provided women in Ireland 
with non-directive counselling regarding the legal option of obtaining an abor-
tion abroad. Two private persons, Mrs X and Ms Geraghty joined the applica-
tion of Dublin Well to the European Court of Human Rights as women of 
child-bearing age.156 The above complained to the European Court of Human 
Rights of an injunction imposed by the Irish Supreme Court on the non-profit 
organisations Open Door and Dublin Well. The aim of the injunction was to 
prohibit Open Door and Dublin Well from providing certain information re-
garding abortion to pregnant women. 
 
The applicants alleged that the Supreme Court injunction, especially the provi-
sion regarding information to pregnant women, infringed the rights of the cor-
porate applicants and the two counsellors to impart information as well as the 
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rights of Mrs X and Ms Geraghty to receive information.157 They invoked their 
right to freedom of expression under Article 10 § 1 ECHR, which provides that 
everyone has the right to freedom of expression and that this right shall include 
the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. On the 
other hand, the Government argued in favour of the protection of the life of the 
foetus and pointed to a referendum showing the Irish consensus on the equal 
right to life of the pregnant woman and the foetus.158 
 
The private persons Mrs X and Ms Geraghty were not affiliated with the com-
panies, nor were they pregnant. However, since they were women of child-
bearing age and as such were running the risk of being directly affected by the 
injunction, the European Court of Human Rights settled that the Convention 
entitled them to contend that the injunction violated their rights under Article 
10 § 1 ECHR.159 
 
The Irish Government had accepted that the injunction interfered with the free-
dom of the corporate applicants to impart information, but not with the freedom 
to impart and receive information of the other applicants.160 The European 
Court of Human Rights established, contrary to the Government, that there had 
been an interference with the right of the applicant counsellors to impart infor-
mation since the scope of the injunction included restrictions on servants or 
agents of the corporate applicants from assisting pregnant women. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights also established an interference with the right of 
Mrs X and Ms Geraghty to receive information.161 Even though the Court con-
sidered the special protection awarded by national legislation to the foetus, it 
did not find the injunction against the applicants a measure motivated by a 
pressing social need and it did not find it proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.162  
 
To conclude, the Court established that in spite of the very strong protection 
awarded to the foetus in Irish legislation, the hindrance of the two non-profit 
companies and the two women from receiving and imparting information re-
garding reproductive health was not motivated by a pressing social need or 
proportionate to the aim pursued. The fact that the ECHR established this right 
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to receive and impart information regarding abortion resulted in an amendment 
to the Irish Constitution. This provided that other regulations “[...] shall not 
limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, [...] information relating 
to services lawfully available in another State”.163 
4.3 The Right to Respect for Private Life 
and Access to Abortion 
The previous section showed that even if a restriction is prescribed by law and 
the state is pursuing a legitimate aim, it cannot limit individuals’ and corpora-
tion’s freedom of expression on lawful abortion unless the limitation is propor-
tionate to the aim pursued. Article 8 of the Convention on the right to respect 
for private and family life, shows a different aspect of access to lawful abortion. 
The article encompasses, inter alia, the protection of private life and is one of 
the most central provisions of the Convention with regards to abortion.164 An-
other provision, deriving not from the Council of Europe, but from the UN-
system is Article 16 (1) (e) in the United Nations Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). It enacts that 
women have a right to freely, and responsibly, decide the number and spacing 
of children.165 This right can be said to correspond with a similar right under 
Article 8 ECHR on the right to respect for private and family life as it corre-
sponds with private and family life, but also with the right to health of 
women.166 
 
With the assistance of the case A, B and C v. Ireland from 2010 this section 
initially provides an understanding of abortion in relation to the right to private 
life in Article 8 ECHR.167 Second, it discusses the protection of women’s ac-
cess to lawful abortion under Article 8 ECHR and put it in contrast with the 
practice of conscientious objection in a healthcare setting. Two recent cases 
address this issue, R.R. v. Poland from 2011 and P. and S. v. Poland from 2012. 
These cases are examined and analysed in the present chapter to clarify CoE 
Member States’ obligations when balancing the right to respect for private life 
and the practice of conscientious objection. Poland is a state with strict regula-
tion on abortion, but it still provides a legal right to abortion under specific cir-
cumstances. Poland also provides a right to conscientiously object, which 
makes these cases highly relevant to the present context. 
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4.3.1 A, B and C v. Ireland 
The case of A, B and C v. Ireland mainly relates to the question of a Conven-
tion-based right to abortion, but it also addresses the question of access to abor-
tion in relation to Article 8 ECHR. 
 
Prior to 2010, the European Court of Human Rights found that national legisla-
tion, regulating the termination of pregnancies was within the ambit of the right 
to private life under Article 8 ECHR.168 However, it was insecure what protec-
tion Article 8 provided in relation to abortion. In the Grand Chamber case A, B 
and C v. Ireland from 2010169, the Court pointed out that even though abortion 
was an aspect of Article 8 ECHR, pregnancy and abortion was not to be inter-
preted exclusively as aspects of a woman’s private life since the private life of 
the pregnant woman becomes closely intertwined with the developing foetus.170 
This reasoning led the Court to establish that it cannot interpret Article 8 as 
conferring a Convention based right to abortion.171 However, since complaints 
relating to abortion still fall within the ambit of Article 8, it makes it possible to 
petition the ECtHR for other reasons than asking the ECtHR to establish a legal 
right to abortion in a country where it was previously illegal. 
 
Hence, in the case A, B and C v. Ireland, the Court could not establish a right to 
abortion in Ireland that did not already exist in the Irish legal framework. How-
ever, since the Irish  Constitution provided a right to abortion in a few specific 
situations, including when a pregnancy poses a risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman172, the Court could assess whether Ireland provided real access to this 
right in the present case. 
 
The third applicant to the Court, applicant C, was pregnant and had contracted a 
rare form of cancer three years earlier. Because of the cancer, she feared that 
she would not survive the pregnancy.173 The applicant consulted her general 
practitioner and several other medical consultants, but she believed that, due to 
the ‘chilling effect’ caused by the general ban on abortion in Ireland, she had 
received insufficient information regarding the possible risks the pregnancy 
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posed to her life.174 Therefore, she travelled to England, where she had an abor-
tion. The abortion performed in England was however incomplete, causing the 
applicant prolonged bleeding and infection.  
 
Due to the lack of an effective and accessible procedure to establish her right to 
a lawful abortion, the third applicant lodged a complaint principally under Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention. She alleged that Ireland had failed to implement a pro-
cedure by which she could have established if she qualified for a lawful abor-
tion in Ireland on grounds of the risk to her life.175 
 
Before the Court, the Government held that the applicant had to prove the al-
leged medical risk in order for an abortion to be lawful. However, the Court 
stressed that due to the lack of any effective domestic procedure to establish her 
right to have an abortion, the applicant did not have to demonstrate the alleged 
medical risk in relation to the Court.176 
 
The Government refused to acknowledge that there was a lack of effective and 
accessible procedures. Contrary to the Government, the Court held that the only 
non-judicial means constituting a procedure, was the ordinary medical consulta-
tion process between a woman and her doctor.177 This was not considered an 
effective and accessible procedure to establish whether the third applicant was 
entitled to a lawful abortion in Ireland, because of several reasons. One of the 
main reasons being that there was no legal framework in place to allow for a 
difference of opinion between the woman and the doctor to be examined and 
resolved through a decision that could establish the legality of the woman’s 
request.178 
 
The Government alleged that the applicant also had the option to initiate a con-
stitutional action in order for her right to a lawful abortion to be established.179 
However, the ECtHR did not find this an effective way to ensure the third ap-
plicant’s right to respect for her private life, since a constitutional court could 
not be considered the appropriate forum to decide, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether a woman had the right to a lawful abortion.180 Another concern of the 
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Court was that Ireland had not amended its Offences Against the Person Act 
1861181 to comply with the Irish Constitution concerning the legality of abor-
tion where the life of the pregnant woman is at risk. The criminal provisions of 
the 1861 Act provided that anyone to perform or to undergo an abortion would 
risk serious criminal conviction and imprisonment.182 The Court emphasised 
that the lack of amendment constituted an obstacle to the third applicant’s ac-
cess to her lawful right to have an abortion.183 
 
The Court found that there had been a violation of Article 8 ECHR since the 
Irish authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligation to secure an 
accessible and effective procedure by which the applicant could establish 
whether or not she qualified for a lawful abortion in accordance with the Irish 
Constitution.184 According to the Court “[...] the lack of effective and accessible 
procedures to establish a right to an abortion under that provision, [resulted] in 
a striking discordance between the theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Ire-
land on the ground of a relevant risk to a woman’s life and the reality of its 
practical implementation”.185 
 
This case clearly shows some of the issues arising when there is a discrepancy 
between the legal and the actual access to abortion. It also shows that it is 
within the state’s discretion to decide whether or not to provide a legal right to 
abortion. If, however, a national legal system provides a right to abortion, this 
case demonstrates that the state cannot refrain from providing accessibility to 
this right. According to the present case, access to abortion means that a woman 
seeking legal abortion should be provided an accessible and effective procedure 
where her rights can be established. Within this concept lies an obligation of the 
state to provide a legal framework which is not contradictory in relation to the 
legality of abortion. In addition, CoE Member States are obliged to provide a 
mechanism to establish when the provisions of obtaining a lawful abortion are 
satisfied. This prerequisite is not satisfied through one doctor’s evaluation of 
the situation. Lastly, judicial proceedings are not a suitable means to establish a 
legal right to abortion. In particular, constitutional proceedings are dismissed as 
inept by the ECtHR since a constitutional court is not the correct forum and 
because it is inappropriate that pregnant women should take on such complex 
procedures in relation to a right that is clearly established in the constitution.186 
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4.3.2 R.R. v. Poland 
The case R.R. v. Poland187 differs from the case A, B and C v. Ireland in a 
number of ways. A, B and C v. Ireland mainly concerns the right to an effective 
and accessible procedure to establish a right to abortion and R.R. v. Poland 
concerns access to lawful abortion and prenatal testing as contrasted by consci-
entious objection. When R.R. was in the 18th week of gestation, the medical 
doctors informed her that the foetus was probably affected with malformation. 
R.R. responded that if this proved to be true, she wished to have an abortion.188 
Abortion is considered lawful in a handful situations in Polish law. Section 4 
(a) of the Polish Law on Family Planning (Protection of the Human Foetus and 
Conditions Permitting Pregnancy Termination) from 1993 (hereinafter the 
1993 Act), establishes a right to obtain an abortion lawfully when prenatal tests 
indicate a high risk that the foetus suffers from a deformation which is severe 
and irreversible or which is incurable and life-threatening. It is also necessary 
that the foetus is not capable of surviving outside the mother’s body.189 In addi-
tion, section 2 (a) of the 1993 Act provides that the state and local authorities 
are obliged to ensure unimpeded access to prenatal information and testing, in 
particular in cases of increased risk or suspicion of a genetic disorder or devel-
opment problem or of an incurable life-threatening disease.190 
 
At a number of ultrasound scans, at different medical clinics, R.R. was recom-
mended a genetic test to make sure, beyond doubt, that the foetus indeed had a 
malformation.191 When R.R. asked the family doctor, Dr S.B, for the referral 
needed, he refused to provide her with this because “in his view the foetus’ 
condition did not qualify the applicant for an abortion under the provisions of 
the 1993 Act”192. As the ultrasound scans were not a sufficient ground for ter-
mination of pregnancy, it was necessary for R.R. to gain access to genetic ex-
amination. After the refusal of the family doctor, she, therefore, went to differ-
ent hospitals, each reaffirming the probable malformation of the foetus, but 
each refusing to provide her with the genetic examination. Furthermore, in spite 
of the probable deformation of the foetus,  her decision to terminate the preg-
nancy was repeatedly questioned.193 Finally, during the twenty-third week of 
pregnancy she was accepted as an emergency patient and had the tests per-
formed. Awaiting the test results, R.R. requested a termination twice. Two 
weeks later she received the results of the test, which confirmed the presence of 
Turner syndrome in the foetus and requested termination of the pregnancy 
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again, the very same day.194 At this point, the doctors refused to carry out the 
abortion, as they alleged the foetus was now viable and could survive outside 
the womb.195 
 
The applicant invoked Article 3 ECHR on the prohibition of torture, Article 8 
ECHR on the right to respect for private and family life, and complained under 
Article 13 ECHR that she did not have access to an effective remedy.196 For the 
relevance of this chapter, her complaint under Article 8 ECHR is examined 
below. 
 
In its assessment, the Court held that the applicant’s process of obtaining access 
to genetic examination of the foetus was “[...] marred by procrastination, confu-
sion and lack of proper counselling and information given to the applicant”.197 
Regarding the applicants right to obtain information on her condition, the Court 
clarified that Article 8 of the Convention contains a right to obtain information 
on one’s medical condition. The Court stressed that the effective exercise of 
this right was vital for her possibility to exercise her right to personal autonomy 
under article 8 ECHR.198 In situations where medical conditions may develop 
rapidly, timely access to information on one’s health is crucial. Applied to the 
context of pregnancy, this means that timely access to information on the health 
conditions of the woman and the foetus is directly relevant for pregnant 
women’s exercise of their personal autonomy.199 
 
CoE Member States have both negative and positive obligations in relation in 
ensuring the ‘respect’ for private life in Article 8 ECHR. The boundaries be-
tween these obligations are not easily defined, but the principle is the same. A 
fair balance must be struck between the competing interests of the society as a 
whole and the individual in both cases.200 The positive obligation to secure re-
spect for women’s private life may include measures and mechanisms active in 
the sphere of relations between individuals.201 Nota bene that in the present case 
this primarily means the relation between women and objecting healthcare pro-
viders. Furthermore, the notion of ‘respect’ is not unambiguous. It must adjust 
to varying, and complex situations in the Contracting States and because of 
this, its requirements vary between different situations.202 Even though it is 
constantly changing, the states have to abide by the rule of law. The Court em-
phasised that the principle of rule of law is one of the fundamental principles in 
a democratic society and that it is inherent in all the articles of the Convention. 
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Thus, the Contracting States need to make sure that rules of domestic law “[...] 
provide a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention”.203 
 
In the present case, the Court clearly stated that CoE Member States must en-
sure that conscientious objectors in the healthcare context are not infringing 
women’s lawful right to abortion. In exact words, it declared: 
 
States are obliged to organise the health services system in such a way 
as to ensure that an effective exercise of the freedom of conscience of 
health professionals in the professional context does not prevent pa-
tients from obtaining access to services to which they are entitled un-
der the applicable legislation.204 
 
To conclude, the applicant had been denied adequate and timely access to pre-
natal genetic testing, which would have made it possible to establish whether 
she was entitled to a lawful termination of the pregnancy or not.205 The Court 
considered that the respondent state’s failure to effectively implement its abor-
tion laws constituted a violation of its positive obligations under Article 8 
ECHR. This violation occurred as the state had failed to implement a procedure 
which constituted an effective and accessible procedure to regulate disagree-
ments between a pregnant woman and doctors as  to the need of prenatal ge-
netic testing.206 Outside of the scope of this section, but still of interest, is the 
fact that the Court in this case, for the first time in a reproductive rights case, 
found a violation of Article 3 ECHR on the prohibition of torture.207 
4.3.3 P. and S. v. Poland 
In the judgment P. & S. v. Poland208 from 2012, a fourteen-year-old girl (the 
first applicant) was raped and, as a result, she became pregnant.209 She alleged 
that she had been raped on 8 April 2008. The first applicant decided together 
with her mother (the second applicant) to have an abortion.210 Poland’s strict 
abortion statute permits a female assault victim an abortion. The Polish 1993 
Act guarantees the right to obtain an abortion lawfully until the end of the 
twelfth week of pregnancy when “there are strong grounds for believing that 
the pregnancy is the result of a criminal act”. In another provision of the 1993 
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Act, the circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act need to be certified 
by a prosecutor in order for the abortion to be lawful.211 On 20 May 2008 the 
District Prosecutor issued the necessary certificate declaring that the pregnancy 
of the first applicant resulted from unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor. 
 
In order to actually obtain the abortion, the applicants were told that they 
needed to get a referral for abortion from the regional consultant of gynecology 
and obstetrics. The consultant refused to provide her with this referral. When 
the two applicants subsequently applied for having the legal abortion performed 
in other medical institutions in both Lublin and in Warsaw, they were obstruct-
ed by dissenting healthcare providers, as well as catholic priests and abortion 
objectors.212 On several occasions the first applicant was interrogated by au-
thorities questioning her decision to have an abortion, without her parents or 
any other adults or legal assistance present to represent her as a minor.213 The 
process of receiving the abortion that had been certified by the District Prosecu-
tor as lawful was repeatedly procrastinated, and it was not until 17 June 2008, 
more than two months after the rape, that the first applicant was driven approx-
imately 500 kilometers by the Ministry of Health to have an abortion in 
Gdánsk. The applicants alleged that when the abortion in Gdánsk was finally 
provided, it was in a clandestine manner.214 When the abortion was performed, 
a total of 9 weeks had passed since the applicants had decided that the first ap-
plicant was to have an abortion. The legal limit of having an abortion due to the 
pregnancy being a result of a criminal act was 12 weeks into the pregnancy.215 
If the applicants had realised that she was pregnant a little later, the obstructions 
and the delays of the healthcare providers might have resulted in the loss of her 
legal right to abortion. 
 
To the European Court of Human Rights the applicants alleged that the circum-
stances of their case had given rise to violations of Articles 8, 3 and 5 of the 
Convention. In this context, the Court’s assessment of the alleged violations of 
Article 8 ECHR is of central importance. 
 
In its assessment, the Court noted that conscientious objection is a recognised 
right in the Polish legal system.216 It also noted that there was a mechanism in 
place by which an objection could be voiced. The mechanism also provided 
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some balance between the interests of a healthcare provider and the interests of 
patients by making it mandatory for a healthcare provider’s conscientious ob-
jection to be included in the patient’s medical record and for a healthcare pro-
vider to refer the patient to a different physician capable of carrying out the 
same service.217 However, the Court concluded that these procedural require-
ments were not complied with in the present case. It stated that the applicants 
were provided with misleading and contradictory information and that the 
medical counselling they received was neither objective nor appropriate. There 
was also a lack of a set procedure where the interests of the healthcare provid-
ers and the interests of the applicants could be weighed and the views of the 
applicants be heard.218 The Polish Government alleged that the applicants could 
bring a civil lawsuit and that this would satisfy the need for a set procedure. 
The Court rejected the civil-law remedy since it was of a retroactive and com-
pensatory character and did not present women seeking an abortion with an 
opportunity to fully vindicate their right to respect for private life. The only way 
to fully ensure that women’s right to private life is not violated, is to introduce 
a mechanism to establish their lawful right to abortion, prior to giving birth.219  
 
Regarding the misleading and contradictory information provided by the ob-
jecting healthcare providers, the Court emphasised that effective access to in-
formation when abortion is lawful and what procedures to follow to be able to 
enjoy this lawful right is “directly relevant for the exercise of personal auton-
omy”.220  
 
The Court pointed out that the notion of private life applies both to decisions to 
become and not to become a parent.221 The Court also highlighted that the na-
ture of a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy was such that the time 
factor was of high importance. Because of this, the Court states that the proce-
dures establishing a right to lawful abortion should make it possible for a preg-
nant woman to make such decisions in good time.222 The Court highlighted 
that: 
 
[O]nce the State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statu-
tory regulations allowing abortion in some situations, it must not 
structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real possi-
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bilities to obtain an abortion. In particular, the State is under a positive 
obligation to create a procedural framework enabling a pregnant 
woman to effectively exercise her right of access to lawful abor-
tion[emphasis added].223 
 
In the same paragraph of the Judgment, the Court held that the Convention “is 
intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are 
practical and effective”.224 As in A, B and C v. Ireland, the Court in this case 
concluded that there was a striking discordance between the theoretical right to 
lawful abortion and its real implementation.225 The Court found that there had 
been a breach of Article 8 since the authorities had failed to comply with their 
positive obligation to secure the applicants effective respect for their private 
life.226 
4.3.4 Limitations of the Right to Private Life 
In the previous sections it was shown that, at the present time, the Convention 
cannot be used to confer a right to abortion in the CoE Member States. How-
ever, queries in relation to abortion fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR and 
are, therefore, under the scrutiny of the Court, and in relation to access to abor-
tion the Court recognizes a right to effectively enjoy this right if abortion is 
legal on a national level. Meaning that when there already is a lawful right to 
abortion at the national level, the Convention puts an obligation on CoE Mem-
ber States to set up a procedure to establish whether a citizen is entitled to have 
an abortion or not. 
 
With regard to conscientious objection in the healthcare context, the question is 
what possibilities there are to interfere with the rights under Article 8 ECHR. 
An interference with the right to private life in Article 8 may be justifiable if 
the two prerequisites in 8 § 2 ECHR have been met. The first prerequisite re-
quires the interference to be ‘prescribed by law’. In the case Rekvényi v. Hun-
gary, the European Court of Human Rights explained that there are qualitative 
requirements on national legislation regarding foreseeability and, generally, the 
absence of arbitrariness in order for it to be ‘prescribed by law’.227 Foreseeabil-
ity means in this context that the law has to be formulated with adequate preci-
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sion to enable citizens to foresee what consequences a given action may induce 
at a given time.228 
 
When applied to conscientious objection, it signifies that if conscientious objec-
tion is considered by the Court to interfere with the rights under Article 8 
ECHR, the state has to make sure that the foundation for the right to conscien-
tious objection is prescribed by law, meaning that it has to be foreseeable to 
state citizens and non-arbitrary in its construction. 
 
If a legal right to conscientiously object is established on a national level, and if 
that practice interferes with Article 8 ECHR, any interference need to be ‘nec-
essary in a democratic society’. This means that the societal interest of having a 
legal possibility to conscientiously object need to outweigh the infringement of 
the individual’s right to access a lawful abortion. How to strike a balance be-
tween the interests is generally for each state to decide within its margin of 
appreciation, but the deliberation of the state is still subject to the review of the 
ECtHR.229  
 
Summarising the European Court of Human Rights’ case law on the right to 
private life in relation to access to lawful abortion, it is clear that if a Council of 
Europe Member State has passed laws permitting abortion, with or without 
certain provisions, the Member State must also guarantee accessibility to the 
procedure.230 The Court especially emphasises that there should be procedures 
in force in these Member States, that effectively clarify the legal situation and 
which can provide a decision on whether a woman is entitled to a lawful abor-
tion. In the two cases, R.R. v. Poland and P. and S. v. Poland, that addressed 
conscientious objection in relation to abortion, the Court decided in favour of 
women’s access to lawful abortions, notwithstanding a legal right to conscien-
tiously object in Poland. 
4.4 Access to Abortion in the Council of 
Europe 
Chapter 4 on Access to Lawful Abortion Services showed that, in relation to the 
right to health, states are obliged to provide equal and non-discriminatory ac-
cess to healthcare and that they have to provide reproductive healthcare on a 
timely and non-discriminatory basis. In relation to conscientious objection this 
means that a state which allows that practice, must also provide a very strict set 
of rules and control mechanisms in order to guarantee the right to health. 
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Healthcare systems that do not provide for the specific health needs of women, 
necessarily violates Article 11 ESC or Article 11 ESC in conjunction with Arti-
cle E of the Charter. In addition, there is a requirement that all treatment shall 
be based on transparent criteria and agreed at a national level. Furthermore, 
the Court has created the possibility to interpret a right to health in the Conven-
tion, which provides for a stronger protection in relation to access to healthcare 
and thus for access to lawful abortion. In addition, the Court emphasised that a 
limitation of women’s right to receive and impart information on abortion can 
be disproportionate in relation to public interests, even if these public interests 
have been established by public referendum. 
 
In relation to women’s right to respect for private life in Article 8 ECHR, the 
Court expresses that it cannot establish an obligation for CoE Member States to 
legalise abortion emanating from the Convention. In spite of that, it makes clear 
that it is possible to petition the ECtHR regarding questions of access to lawful 
abortion. The Court also clarified that if a Council of Europe Member State has 
passed laws that permit abortion the Member State has an obligation to guaran-
tee the accessibility to the lawful abortion procedure in practice.231 This entails 
an obligation for CoE Member States with a legal right to abortion to have ef-
fective and accessible procedures in force, which can clarify the legal situation 
and provide a decision on whether a woman is entitled to a lawful abortion or 
not. If there is no such procedure in place, an applicant to the Court does not 
bear the burden of proof to establish if the provisions of national legislation 
have been met in order for her to qualify for an abortion. Within the concept of 
establishing an accessible and effective procedure also lies the obligation of the 
state to provide a legal framework which is not contradictory in relation to the 
legality of abortion. Two measures that are not effective and accessible in 
themselves, are judicial proceedings and assessments by healthcare providers 
without a control mechanism. 
 
The Court emphasised in both R.R. v. Poland and P. and S. v. Poland that 
Member States with a legal right to abortion are obliged to organise their health 
services system in a way that ensures that healthcare providers’ conscientious 
objections do not prevent patients from obtaining access to services to which 
they are entitled under the applicable legislation.232 
 
In the two cases where the Court has addressed conscientious objection in rela-
tion to abortion, R.R. v. Poland and P. and S. v. Poland, the Court decided in 
favour of women’s access to lawful abortions despite a legal right to conscien-
tiously object in the respondent state. These cases show the weight of women’s 
personal autonomy in questions of reproductive health. In addition, they clarify 
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that the rights of the patient should be the main focal point in the national 
healthcare systems of the Contracting States. 
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5 Two States - Two Regulations 
This chapter examines the regulation and implementation of conscientious ob-
jection and women’s access to lawful abortions on a national level, more spe-
cifically in Italy and Sweden. These states have been chosen to show that a lack 
of effective access to abortion services on a national level is partly a result of 
healthcare provider’s objections. Sweden and Italy are well fitted as examples 
as they both provide a right to lawful abortion to their citizens. When their 
abortion regulations were evaluated by the United Nations (hereinafter UN) in 
its global study on abortion, Italy’s abortion system complied with six parame-
ters out of seven and Sweden’s abortion system adhered to seven parameters 
out of seven.233 The parameters used by the UN are; to save the life of the 
woman, to preserve physical health, to preserve mental health, due to rape or 
incest, due to foetal impairment, due to economic or social reasons and if it is 
available on request (without having to give reasons). Of these, it is only the 
last parameter that differs between the two countries. This means that they both 
have a liberal view on abortion. However, they differ in the implementation of 
the abortion right. Another important difference is the fact that Italy recognises 
a right for healthcare providers to conscientiously object, whereas the same 
practice is illegal in Sweden.  
 
Another reason for choosing these states is the fact that two collective com-
plaints have been lodged against Italy as well as Sweden with the European 
Committee of Social Rights, for reasons of conscientious objection to abortion. 
The ECSR oversees compliance with the European Social Charter. The main 
reason behind the complaint against Italy was the lack of access to lawful abor-
tion care due to the unrestricted use of conscientious objection. On the other 
hand, the main reason behind the complaint against Sweden was the lack of a 
legal option to conscientiously object to performing abortions. 
 
It is important to notice that the collective complaint against Italy has resulted 
in a decision by the Committee. This decision is, therefore, discussed in relation 
to Italy’s legislation on abortion. The complaint against Sweden, on the other 
hand, has not yet resulted in a decision, hence the outcome is at the present time 
unknown. Instead of discussing the decision of the Committee, the section on 
Sweden, therefore, shows the Swedish regulation in a retrospective and con-
temporary perspective. It also lifts the main arguments of the complainant or-
ganisation and three intervening organisations. 
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5.1 Italy 
In Italy, a large number of gynaecologists, medical doctors and other healthcare 
personnel are refusing to perform lawful abortions. The effect of their joint 
refusals is that it is not possible for the state to guarantee access to the medical 
care that it has agreed to provide in legal documents. This chapter seeks to an-
swer if the Italian Government has taken enough steps to secure effective ac-
cess to abortion services. 
 
The Italian Act No 94 of 22 May 1978 Norme per la tutela sociale della mater-
nità e sull’interruzione volontaria della gravidanza - Gazzetta ufficiale 
22/05/1978 n. 140234 or Norms on the social protection of motherhood and the 
voluntary termination of pregnancy (hereinafter the 194/1978 Act) legalises 
abortion and provides women with the right to receive an abortion during the 
first 90 days of pregnancy.235 Abortion is always allowed if pregnancy, child-
birth or motherhood seriously endangers the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman. If there is no such danger, a decision must be motivated in 
view of her state of health, her social, economic or family situation or, due to 
the circumstances in which the conception occurred or, if there is a risk of de-
formities or abnormalities of the foetus.236 These reasons represent six out of 
seven parameters used by the United Nations in its assessment of abortion poli-
cies.237 Italy does not accept abortion on request without providing reasons, but 
in all other situations, the 194/1978 Act provides a right to abortion.238 
 
More than 90 days into the pregnancy a voluntary abortion might still be per-
formed, but only if continued pregnancy entails a serious threat to a woman’s 
life or where pathological processes have been diagnosed that are constituting a 
serious threat to her physical or psychological health.239 
 
In Section 9 of the same law, healthcare providers are ensured the right to con-
scientiously object to performing abortions if they have declared to the provin-
cial medical officer and the medical director of a hospital or nursing home 
within a month from the date of commencement of employment at an estab-
lishment required to provide services for the termination of pregnancy, from the 
date of qualification or the drawing up of an insurance agreement containing 
the provision of such services. However, the second paragraph of Section 9 
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makes it possible to declare a conscientious refusal at any time, with one month 
for the objection to enter into effect.240 
 
There are a number of exceptions to the right to conscientiously object in Act 
194/1978. Paragraph 3 contains a specific provision limiting conscientious ob-
jection in relation to care prior to abortion and aftercare. Paragraph 4 concerns 
women’s right to access lawful abortion services. It requests all hospitals and 
authorised nursing homes to ensure that pregnancy termination requested in 
accordance with the 194/1978 Act are carried out. The region has the obligation 
to supervise and ensure the implementation of these provisions, including mov-
ing personnel if necessary.241 
 
The third exception is found in paragraph 5 and it prohibits healthcare providers 
from invoking conscientious objection if there is an imminent danger to a 
woman’s life, and his or her personal intervention is necessary in order to save 
the life of the woman. The conscientious objection may however be withdrawn 
voluntarily at any time, and it is deemed withdrawn with immediate effect if the 
objector participates in terminating a pregnancy in other cases than where the 
life of the pregnant woman is in impending danger.242 
 
The question is how these provisions are enforced and if the right to conscien-
tious objection for healthcare providers in Italy results in an infringement of the 
right to access abortion services. In 2012, the European Network of the Interna-
tional Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF EN) brought a complaint against 
Italy to the European Committee of Social Rights of the Council of Europe 
(ECSR), alleging that the practice of conscientious objection is impeding 
women’s right to health. 243 
 
In the case IPPF EN v. Italy, the IPPF EN complained that the wording of para-
graph 4, Section 9 of the 194/1978 Act, which governs the conscientious objec-
tion of medical practitioners, violate the right to protection of health in Article 
11 of the Revised European Social Charter (the Charter), read alone or in con-
junction with the non-discrimination clause in Article E of the Charter, since it 
does not offer protection to women’s lawful access to abortion.244 
 
According to the IPPF EN the above-mentioned paragraph is rendered ineffec-
tive, and the full implementation of Act 194/1978 is prevented due to the large 
number of conscientiously objecting healthcare providers in Italy. The lack of 
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specific provisions to ensure women’s effective access to abortion procedures 
obstructs the enactment of Act 194/1978.245  
 
The respondent Government answered to IPPF EN’s complaint and invited the 
Committee to declare the complaint of IPPF EN unfounded. The Government 
claimed that IPPF EN’s interpretation distorted Article 11 and Article E of the 
Charter. It also claimed that there was no possibility for the Government to 
limit the number of objecting healthcare providers, because it would then vio-
late Article 9 of the ECHR on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.246 The Government finally stated that Act 194/1978 provided for a 
good balance of the interests of the woman and the interests of the objecting 
healthcare provider and that the reduction in the number of abortions was solely 
the result of abortion prevention services.247 It also held that the constant in-
crease of objection healthcare providers started to stabilise after year 2010 and 
emphasised that the national committee investigating the issue is positive to 
promote a revision of its internal organisation to make a more differentiated 
selection of human resources.248 
 
The intervening organisation Associazione Italiana per l’educazione demo-
grafica (AIED) is a non-governmental organisation with the aim inter alia to 
ensure that laws are properly enforced in terms of contraception, abortion and 
social-health prevention. The AIED stresses that based on available data, seven 
gynaecologists out of ten were refusing to perform abortions in Italy 2012.249 
AIED is also concerned that the number of clandestine and illegal abortions is 
increasing in Italy as a result of the decreasing number of non-objecting gynae-
cologists.250 It also considers that the territorial allocation of objectors is not 
evenly distributed in Italy, resulting in some regions being more exposed to the 
effect of objecting healthcare providers.251 
 
Another intervening organisation, Associazione Luca Coscioni per la libertà 
per la ricerca scientifica (ALC), a non-governmental organisation which pro-
motes freedom of care and scientific research, points out that the increasing 
level of conscientious objection in Italy exposes contradictions in the national 
legal framework. The legislation is self-contradictory since the increasing level 
of conscientious objectors undermines the provision of adequate service se-
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cured in the same legal documents as the legal right to conscientious objec-
tion.252 ALC is also supporting the statement of the AIED that some citizens, 
for reasons of regional differences et cetera, might be more exposed to the risk 
of encountering a conscientious objector while seeking an abortion than others. 
The ALC considers this increased exposure an issue of discrimination. The fact 
that women in some parts of the country need to travel to search for a clinic 
offering the legal treatment of abortion constitutes territorial and economic 
discrimination towards them. 
 
An opposing intervening organisation, The European Centre for Law and Jus-
tice (ECLJ), which is a non-governmental organisation that promotes liberty of 
conscience and religion, point out that conscientious objection is a personal, 
fundamental and inalienable right and that abortion, on the other hand is not a 
fundamental right. The ECLJ is of the view that the right to conscientious ob-
jection exist outside of any legislative permission, meaning that anyone should 
be able to conscientiously object at any time without state interference. The 
ECLJ also contends that the implementation of the 194/1978 Act concerning 
abortions where the life of the mother is at risk, is too broad and that a health-
care provider is “[...]fully entitled to exercise his freedom of conscientious ob-
jection as secured under Article 9 of the 1978 Law”253 in these cases.254 
  
The Committee held in its assessment of the case that, in Italy, there had been a 
decrease in the total number of hospitals and nursing homes that carry out abor-
tions, and that there is a discrepancy between the number of available non-
objecting healthcare providers and the number of requests to terminate preg-
nancies.255 The hospitals that in effect provide the legal abortion on demand 
within 90 days of the pregnancy are not spread evenly throughout the country 
and there is a risk of geographical zones where abortion services are non-
available, despite the legal requirement of access to such services. There were, 
as a matter of fact, a considerable number of healthcare facilities in Italy with 
either one or no non-objecting gynaecologists.256 The waiting times to receive a 
lawful abortion at an Italian healthcare facility were unreasonable. At several 
hospitals, there were no replacements of non-objecting healthcare providers 
when they went away for vacation, when they were ill or when they retire. 
Abortion procedures were repeatedly deferred due to the lack of non-objecting 
healthcare providers.257 Contrary to Section 9 paragraph 3 of Act 194/1978, 
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healthcare personnel have also illegally refused to provide the needed medical 
care prior to and following abortion.258 
 
The Committee considered that it had not been demonstrated that the steps 
taken by the Government, which comprise of the mobilisation of staff and the 
introduction of pharmacological abortions, guaranteed effective access to abor-
tion facilities in practice. 
 
The Committee was concerned that the increasing number of clandestine abor-
tions were a symptom of the high level of objecting personnel, the lack of 
mechanisms ensuring an effective right to access to abortion and the failure to 
observe the provision of ante- and post-operative care related to abortion pro-
cedures.259 The Committee emphasised that clandestine abortions have the po-
tential of leading to detrimental effects on women’s health.260 
 
In the assessment of the facts of the case in relation to the invoked Article 11 
and Article E, the Committee noted that the differential treatment of individuals 
does not constitute discrimination if it is based on “objective and reasonable 
justification”261, according to the appendix of the Charter.262 However, it stated, 
if a differential treatment does not fulfil these prerequisites, it constitutes dis-
crimination according to Article E of the Charter. 
 
The complaining organisation alleged that Italy was guilty of two types of dis-
crimination, the first being discrimination on the grounds of territorial and/or 
socio-economic status between women who have less restricted access to abor-
tion and those who do not. The second form of alleged discrimination was on 
the grounds of gender, health status, or a combination of the two, between 
women seeking legal abortion services and in relation to men and women seek-
ing access to other legal health services.263 The conclusion by the Committee 
was in accordance with the allegations of IPPF EN. It contended that women 
are discriminated against since they are denied effective access to abortion ser-
vices as a consequence of the “failure of the competent authorities to adopt the 
necessary measures, which are required to compensate for the deficiencies in 
service provision caused by health personnel choosing to exercise their right of 
conscientious objection[...]”264. 
  
Based on the information provided by the parties, the Committee summarised 
that the lack of non-objecting healthcare providers in a number of hospitals and 
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nursing homes in Italy resulted in women having to travel nationally or interna-
tionally, in order to receive the healthcare to which they were legally entitled. 
The Committee emphasised that if women are forced to travel to another region 
or abroad to seek an abortion, the time-factor may deprive them of “any effec-
tive opportunity to avail of their legal entitlement to such services”.265 This is 
harmful to the health of the women concerned, and the Committee concluded 
that “[...]the women concerned are treated differently than other persons in the 
same situation with respect to access to healthcare, without justification.”266 
The conclusion of the Committee was that the situation in Italy constituted a 
violation of Article 11 of the Charter read in conjunction with Article E.267 
 
In addition to the case to the ECSR, the voices of several organisations and 
groups in Italy, for example, The Free Italian Association of Gynaecologists for 
the Law Enforcement of the 194/78 Act have been heard regarding the lack of 
law enforcement in relation to women’s access to lawfully granted abortion 
rights.268 
5.2 Sweden 
The illegality of conscientious objection in Sweden became a topic of interest 
in early 2014, when a newly graduated midwife refused to perform abortions. 
Conscientious objection within the healthcare profession is a rare phenomenon 
in Sweden, which is why the case attracted a lot of attention. The midwife, 
E.G., claimed that while applying for a job, the Jönköping County Council had 
by not hiring her, discriminated against her because of her objection to per-
forming abortions.269 She brought the case to the Swedish Equality Ombuds-
man, who found that the County had not discriminated against her because of 
her belief, since she had been treated the same way everyone refusing to per-
form a core work task would have been.270 In addition to this case, three mo-
tions concerning conscientious objection have been proposed to the Swedish 
Parliament in the past 10 years.271 A complaints procedure has also been initi-
ated in March 2013 by the Federation of Catholic Family Associations in 
Europe (hereinafter FAFCE) in the European Committee for Social Rights 
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(ECSR) against Sweden for not providing a legal right for healthcare providers 
to conscientiously object to performing abortions.272 
 
The FAFCE complained in March 2013 to the European Committee for Social 
Rights that Sweden does not comply with its obligations under the Social Char-
ter. At the present time, the ECSR has not yet reached a decision in the FAFCE 
v. Sweden case.273 For this reason, an aspiration to establish what the Commit-
tee decides would only be speculative. Instead, the main arguments by the par-
ties are presented against a backdrop of historical and contemporary Swedish 
legislation on abortion and conscientious objection. 
 
Before 1939, it was illegal to terminate pregnancies in Sweden. It was esti-
mated that approximately 20 000 clandestine abortions were performed each 
year in Sweden at the beginning of the 1930s. The people performing illegal 
abortions often lacked medical education and used various types of instruments 
to perform the abortions, leaving many young women permanently disabled or 
dead in the aftermaths of the illegal procedures.274 
 
After a process spanning from 1927 to 1938, with repeated parliamentary mo-
tions in favour of lawful abortions, the Termination of Pregnancy Act 
(1938:318)275 entered into force on 1 January 1939. The law allowed abortion 
to be performed if certain provisions were satisfied. A woman could ask to have 
an abortion performed if a continued pregnancy would endanger her life or 
health, if she had become pregnant because of rape or if there were a risk that 
the child would suffer from insanity, mental deficiency, or severe physical ill-
ness.276 Despite the enactment of the Termination of Pregnancy Act in 1939, it 
was difficult to get a request on abortion granted, and the number of clandestine 
abortions was still very high. It was not until the more liberal Swedish Abortion 
Act (1974:595) entered into force on 1 January 1975 that the number of clan-
destine abortions declined.277 Today there are no known clandestine abortions 
in Sweden and the methods used in hospitals are safe and result in few medical 
complications.278 
 
The Swedish 1975 Abortion Act is still in force. Access to abortion is not re-
stricted in terms of age or marital status in Sweden and services are free of 
charge. There is a right to confidentiality in relation to any counselling pro-
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vided to the woman.279 The Abortion Act provides abortion on request until the 
end of the 18th week of gestation, if it cannot be presumed to entail any serious 
danger to the life or health of the woman.280 This means that there is no need to 
furnish the hospital or healthcare provider with a reason for the abortion. How-
ever, if a woman has requested an abortion, she shall be provided supportive 
counselling before the measure is taken.281 Similar counselling shall also be 
provided after the abortion has been performed, although neither of the counsel-
ling sessions is mandatory for the woman.282 After the 18th week of gestation, a 
woman must receive permission by the National Board of Health and Welfare 
in order to have an abortion performed. In order for permission to be granted, 
there have to be special reasons for the abortion. Permission may not be granted 
if there are reasons to assume that the foetus is viable.283 
 
The Swedish Abortion Act is very clear in relation to clandestine abortions. 
Only authorised physicians are allowed to perform abortions, and anyone per-
forming an abortion without being an authorised medical doctor is fined or sen-
tenced to a maximum of one year’s imprisonment.284 The Act is also very clear 
in relation to conscientious objection. If a healthcare provider intentionally re-
fuses to perform or assist an abortion, the National Board of Health and Wel-
fare looks into the situation immediately, and he or she is fined or sentenced to 
a maximum of six months’ imprisonment.285 
 
A Government Bill in the legislative history of the Abortion Act stated that 
healthcare providers that did not want to perform abortions for reasons of con-
science or religion should not be assigned these tasks, due to respect for women 
seeking abortion services.286 The same source emphasises that specific hospital 
managers are in charge of the distribution of the work tasks for the personnel 
and that it is their responsibility to accommodate individual wishes as far as 
possible. Therefore, the Government Bill argues, personnel that for reasons of 
conscience or religion find it difficult to accept such work, should not be tied to 
abortion care facilities.287 
 
On March the 7th 2013, the Federation of Catholic Family Association in 
Europe (FAFCE) brought a complaint against Sweden to the European Com-
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mittee of Social Rights.288 At the time of this writing, the ECSR has not yet 
provided a decision on basis of the complaint. Nevertheless, several organisa-
tions have provided their observations and the Swedish Government has pro-
vided its submissions on the merits.289 
 
This complaint was brought against Sweden in order to show that the state has 
failed to comply with its obligations under Article 11 §§ 1, 2  or 3 ESC on the 
right to protection of health, read alone or in conjunction with Article E ESC on 
the prohibition of discrimination.290 The FAFCE alleges that Sweden’s failure 
to, inter alia, enact a comprehensive and clear legal and policy framework gov-
erning the practice of conscientious objection constitutes a violation of in Arti-
cle 11 ESC. The intervening organisations The Swedish Association for Sexual-
ity Education (RFSU) and the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR) hold that 
the FAFCE fails to specify on the ground of whose health it invokes Article 11 
ESC and contends that the right to freedom of conscience cannot be invoked 
under this article.291 
 
The FAFCE also alleges that Sweden has failed to ensure that conscientiously 
objecting healthcare providers are not discriminated against. The RFSU and the 
CRR point out that in the recent ECtHR case Eweida and Others v. the United 
Kingdom the Court emphasised that the protection of health and safety in the 
hospital was considered far more important than the wearing of a cross to mani-
fest one’s belief. The Court further held that the aim of providing equal oppor-
tunities and non-discrimination of same-sex couples prevails over conscientious 
objection to providing services to the same.292 The intervening organisations 
also emphasised that there had been no appeals before the Swedish Labour 
Court or any negotiations between employers and labour unions regarding dis-
crimination related to employees’ objection to abortion. Neither have there 
been any appeals to the Higher Education’s Appeals Board regarding employ-
ees or students claiming that they were not allowed to be exempted from lec-
tures on abortion care.293 
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The FAFCE holds that the Swedish Government has failed to implement reso-
lution 1763 of the Parliamentary Assembly294 and concludes that Sweden con-
sequently “formally sets itself against freedom of conscience for healthcare 
workers and against the goals of Article 11 of the European Social Charter”.295 
As has been demonstrated above, in section 3.2, this resolution is not binding 
on states. The RFSU and the CRR also maintain that the aim of calling for in-
creased regulation of conscientious objection in Resolution 1763 is to protect 
women’s right to health.296 The Parliamentary Assembly resolutions do not 
exist in a vacuum, and RFSU and CRR cited the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
right to health297, who has held that the practice of conscientious objection con-
stitutes a barrier for women’s reproductive health. The Rapporteur has also 
recommended that regulation on conscientious objection should be specific in 
its provisions, controlled in use and that the objecting healthcare provider is 
required to refer the patient to a non-objecting provider.298 These statements 
combined with other similar statements cited by the organisations show that the 
main concern at an international level is the unavailability of abortion services, 
rather than the protection of the practice to object to providing these services.299 
 
The FAFCE also alleged that, in Europe, a strong consensus has emerged to 
protect medical conscientious objection and that regarding abortion there is an 
“absolute lack of comprehensive and clear legal and policy framework govern-
ing the practice of conscientious objection by healthcare professionals”.300 Fur-
thermore, the FAFCE argues that conscience rights301 do not threaten women’s 
access , but rather protects it, since “[m]any patients want to be able to access 
doctors who practice with integrity by obeying their consciences, and who 
share the patients’ values about the right to life”.302 A third intervening organi-
sation, the Ordo Iuris Institute, maintains that a healthcare provider needs to 
make moral assessments of the acts that he or she is performing within the pro-
fessional sphere. It argues that conscientious objection is not properly regulated 
                                                 
294
 Cf. chapter 3.2. where the resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly are presented in 
detail. 
295
 FAFCE v. Sweden (Complaint No. 99/2013) Case document No. 1, Complaint, 15 
March 2013, pp. 19 - 20. 
296
 FAFCE v. Sweden (Complaint No. 99/2013) Case document No. 5, third-party interven-
tion, ECSR, 9 January 2014, paras. 11 - 16. 
297
 In full: the UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
298
 FAFCE v. Sweden (Complaint No. 99/2013) Case document No. 5, third-party interven-
tion, ECSR, 9 January 2014, paras.12 and 14. 
299
 FAFCE v. Sweden (Complaint No. 99/2013) Case document No. 5, third-party interven-
tion, ECSR, 9 January 2014, para. 14. 
300
 FAFCE v. Sweden (Complaint No. 99/2013) Case document No. 1, Complaint, ECSR, 
15 March 2013, p. 26. 
301
 It is not clear if the FAFCE aims at freedom of conscience or conscientious objection. 
302
 FAFCE v. Sweden (Complaint No. 99/2013) Case document No. 1, Complaint, ECSR, 
15 March 2013, p. 23. 
63 
 
if there are no facilities enabling healthcare providers to “take individual re-
sponsibility in matters of health care services”.303 
 
In response to this, the RFSU and the CRR show that there is no such consen-
sus.304 They further argue that there is no need to regulate conscientious objec-
tion in Sweden in order to secure women’s access to lawful abortion since 
women’s access to abortion is already ensured by law and properly imple-
mented.305 Furthermore, because it has not been proved that healthcare provid-
ers are discriminated against on grounds of their objection to abortion and be-
cause no data has been presented that show that healthcare providers have been 
forced to perform abortions against their will, there is no real need for increased 
regulation on conscientious objection in Sweden.306 
 
As mentioned above, the European Committee of Social Rights has not yet 
provided a decision regarding this complaint. Hence, the outcome of the case is 
not clear. It can however be discussed whether there is a need for regulation 
conscientious objection in Sweden, as there are already mechanisms in place to 
make sure that objecting healthcare providers are given work tasks to which 
they do not object. Situations where a citizen has chosen to study a degree, 
which leads to employment with central tasks that he or she objects to, as in the 
case with the Swedish midwife, E.G., do not show a real need of regulation. 
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6 Analysis and Conclusion 
Through an interest- or problem-oriented approach in combination with a more 
traditional rule-oriented approach, this thesis sought to investigate the existing 
‘gap’ of the CoE regulation of conscientious objection in relation to abortion. 
Finding this gap was crucial to see what protection is actually granted to con-
scientious objectors. 
 
The research questions inquired what balance the Council of Europe has struck 
between the practice of conscientious objection and the national legal right to 
access abortion. They also asked whether it could be argued that healthcare 
providers’ conscientious objections undermine women’s effective access to 
lawful abortion and if there are reasons for additional regulation of the practice 
on a national level or regional level to secure women’s effective access to law-
ful abortion. This chapter aims at answering these questions, based on the mate-
rial provided in previous chapters. 
 
Conscientious objection can be regulated on a national, regional and interna-
tional level. This writing has examined the regulation primarily on a regional 
level, mainly because of the fact that the European Court of Human Rights 
binds all states, which have ratified the Convention, by its decisions and judg-
ments. There is no express right in the European Convention on Human Rights 
for healthcare providers to object to abortion procedures, nor is such a right 
recognised in the European Social Charter. Since conscientious objection is 
performed on grounds of conscience or religion, it can nevertheless be consid-
ered founded in Article 9 of the Convention, if certain conditions are at hand. 
The objection is required to be grounded in a belief of sufficient cogency, seri-
ousness and cohesion, which is also important for the individual, society or 
both, and to some extent have a formal content. These prerequisites need to be 
fulfilled for the belief of the objector to qualify for the forum internum aspect 
of Article 9 ECHR. These prerequisites are important since they prevent indi-
viduals from maintaining that they are Christian one day and Muslim the other. 
If the objector would also like to act on his or her belief, this act (or omission) 
is required to have a sufficiently close and direct connection to the underlying 
belief. Previously the act or omission instead had to be intimately linked to the 
underlying belief, but this was changed in 2013 by the Court’s judgment in the 
case Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom. This change altered the 
Court’s way of assessing conscientious objections in the workplace. There is no 
longer a ‘filter’ causing the Court to render these cases inadmissible due to their 
weak link to the underlying belief. It now evaluates the claims of applicants 
within the proportionality assessment instead. As shown in Eweida and Others, 
the Court did not change its substantive assessments regarding the two appli-
cants objecting to ensuring the rights and freedoms of others, compared to pre-
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vious cases such as Pichon and Sajous v. France. This change merely allows for 
conscientious objectors to have their case accurately assessed by the Court and 
does not provide for an enhanced substantive protection of their rights. 
 
Another effect of the change is that applicants no longer need to be in confor-
mity with religious doctrine in order to gain protection from the Convention, 
something that reasonably facilitates for minorities within religious groups to 
argue that they are entitled to protection from Article 9 ECHR. This seems to 
be an improvement of human rights in an individualistic society, allowing eve-
ryone to think and believe anything they prefer. A problem may however arise 
if this reasoning is transferred to manifestation of belief. The forum internum is 
not problematic in relation to the rights and freedoms of others. The exercise of 
forum externum rights, on the other hand, may create a number of problems for 
others. If all healthcare providers gain equal protection for all their specific 
beliefs and also for the manifestation of these beliefs, it would create a number 
of complications since the manifestation of these beliefs most likely would re-
sult in clashes in between themselves. It would also result in less foreseeability 
for women seeking abortion care. Still, the provisions of seriousness and co-
gency of the belief prevents healthcare providers from maintaining that they 
believe in different things each day, therefore limiting abuse. This partly en-
hances foreseeability, but the fact that healthcare providers may hold and mani-
fest any belief might still have an intimidating effect of women contemplating 
seeking abortion care. 
 
It is possible to make a number of derogations from the right to manifest beliefs 
according to Article 9 ECHR and the case law of the Court. These are common-
ly decided by the CoE Member States within their margin of appreciation. In 
case the state fails to properly regulate or balance the relevant interests, namely 
the interest to manifest a belief and the interest of derogating from this right, 
the state has exceeded its discretion. Eventually, this is decided by the Court 
together with the decision on whether the state has violated the Convention or 
not. Irrespective of at what level the decision is made, the balancing of these 
interests affects women of childbearing age. The main problem in relation to 
abortion is that those decisions often are made retrospectively, i.e. in a situation 
where women have already given birth to the child she was expecting, a child 
that she has to take care of for the majority of her life. An economic remedy 
seems as insufficient reparation in relation to the unwanted parenthood. Particu-
larly, as it might be the effect of rape, as in P. and S. v. Poland or might risk the 
life of the pregnant woman as in A, B and C v. Ireland. 
 
In these cases, the Court highlighted a number of provisions limiting the margin 
of appreciation of the Contracting States in relation to providing real and effec-
tive access to lawful abortion. One such provision was the fact that CoE Mem-
ber States are obliged to organise their health services system so as to ensure 
that healthcare providers’ objections do not prevent women from accessing 
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lawful abortion services. This entails implementing an accessible and effective 
procedure by which women can establish whether they qualify for a lawful 
abortion or not. A procedure was not considered accessible or effective in cases 
where there were no set procedure or mechanism in which the interests of the 
healthcare providers and the interests of the abortion-seeking women could be 
weighed, and the views of the applicants heard. Since the consultation between 
healthcare provider and patient is commonly performed behind closed doors, 
this is one of the most important results from these cases. As a healthcare pro-
vider is in a position of trust and authority in relation to the woman seeking 
abortion care, a set and timely procedure establishing her legal right to abortion 
in cases when their opinions differ, is an important advancement in states with a 
high number of objecting healthcare providers. 
 
The Court noted that there was a mechanism in place in Poland, by which an 
objection could be voiced and which created some balance between the woman 
applying for an abortion and the healthcare provider. Those measures included 
an obligation for the healthcare provider to refer the patient to another 
healthcare provider with the same competence as the first and an obligation for 
the conscientious objection to be included in the patient’s medical record. The 
state had thus established a procedure de jure, but not de facto. The Court held 
that this constituted a breach of the state’s positive obligations in relation to 
Article 8 ECHR. The fact that the Court takes this stance is important since it 
clearly shows that a state does not fulfil its obligations under named article, 
merely by pretending it is ensuring women's right to lawful abortion, but only 
by actually ensuring this right. The Court also clarified that even if a woman is 
treated by an objecting healthcare provider she has the right to adequate, clear 
and objective information. In Poland there was, however, no procedure to ques-
tion the differences in opinion between the woman and the healthcare provider. 
There was, therefore, no way of controlling that the information the applicants 
had received in the named cases met the above requirements. Another provi-
sion, which can be implemented in national legislation, as in Poland, is the ob-
ligation for a refusing healthcare provider to refer women seeking abortion care 
to another healthcare provider who is competent and able to perform the abor-
tion. As seen in the two cases R.R. v. Poland and P. and S. v. Poland, the ob-
jecting healthcare providers did not abide by this rule. If there had been a 
mechanism controlling healthcare providers’ referral of patients, neither of the-
se cases would probably have resulted in complaints to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
 
The Court rejected arguments on civil-law remedies for violations of Article 8 
ECHR, as they were retrospective in their nature and did not provide satisfacto-
ry compensation to women who had been denied an abortion due to objecting 
healthcare providers. In between the lines, it argued that women seeking lawful 
abortion care should be provided with an assessment on their right in good time 
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before any national time limits run out so that she can exercise her right to per-
sonal autonomy effectively.  
 
Several of the Court’s statements under Article 8 ECHR are related to the no-
tion of access to health and healthcare. This is emphasised by the fact that the 
obligations under Article 11 ESC in many aspects correspond with the obliga-
tions voiced by the Court in the cases analysed in relation to the right to private 
life. According to the Committee, the article on the right to protection of health 
puts an obligation on states to provide equal and non-discriminatory access to 
healthcare. In the specific context of reproductive healthcare, states also have to 
make sure that care is provided on a timely and non-discriminatory basis. The 
fact that it needs to be provided on a non-discriminatory basis makes healthcare 
providers’ conscientious objections problematic. Unless the practice is very 
well controlled, its effects are by nature arbitrarily distributed amongst abortion 
seeking women. Hence, it is likely that two women within the same jurisdiction 
are treated differently by representatives of the state, as in Italy, even if they are 
entitled to a lawful abortion on the same grounds. The discriminatory effects of 
conscientious objection to abortion have to be evaluated on a case-by-case ba-
sis, but there is also a structural effect, which has to be taken into consideration. 
An increased regulation of the practice is called for in order to ensure that it 
does not have discriminatory effects. 
 
Regarding women’s access to lawful abortion, there are states which have im-
plemented procedures which effectively secure these rights prior to giving 
birth. Sweden is one such example. From 1939, the country has gone from an 
estimated 20 000 clandestine abortions each year, resulting in many injured and 
killed women, to no known clandestine abortions today. This must be an indi-
cation that the present regulation and its implementation is satisfying Swedish 
women’s need for abortions. The procedures do, however, work in a different 
way than in the other countries reviewed. In Sweden it is the objecting 
healthcare provider that undergoes a procedure and is questioned, instead of the 
pregnant woman. The healthcare provider’s decision is subject to review by the 
Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, which decides whether his or 
her behaviour was lawful. In the meantime, the woman is provided with a dif-
ferent healthcare provider to assist her. The Swedish Abortion Act nonetheless 
limits women’s access to abortion after the 18th week of gestation and permis-
sions for abortions after this week are not given when the foetus is assumed to 
be viable. 
 
Sweden does not recognise a right for healthcare providers to object to perform-
ing abortions, and it can be argued that Sweden, therefore, is not complying 
with its obligations under the Convention or the Charter. However, the question 
whether to recognise conscientious objection to abortion or not is precisely the 
type of question that falls within the state’s discretion. The Swedish regulation 
puts the rights of the patient at the centre of attention. This shows, inter alia, in 
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the Government Bill preceding the Swedish Abortion Act. It states that health-
care providers who object to performing abortion procedures should be given 
other tasks, instead of those to which they object. The Government Bill also 
clarifies that specific hospital managers are responsible for the distribution of 
these tasks. This is a simple solution, which takes the interests of both the care 
seeking women and the objecting healthcare providers into account. Such a 
solution would only be problematic if a very high percentage of the national 
healthcare providers objected to performing abortions. This is not the case in 
Sweden at the present time. According to the recent decision IPPF EN v. Italy 
from the European Committee of Social Rights, this is however the situation in 
Italy. Despite legal regulation on the responsibilities of the authorities regarding 
access to lawful abortion, women in Italy cannot effectively exercise this right. 
The 194/1978 Act requires that hospitals and authorised nursing homes provide 
abortions if they have been requested in line with the provisions of that act. It 
also states that the supervision and implementation of the provisions of the 
194/1978 Act should be ensured at regional level, and that, if necessary, per-
sonnel should be transferred to other parts of the country to even out the num-
ber of objecting and non-objecting healthcare providers. As has been shown in 
the previous chapter, these provisions have not been implemented properly. The 
gap between the legal provisions and the implementation, the law enforcement, 
is questionable in relation to the rule of law principle. If the provisions of the 
194/1978 Act are not enforced, they merely constitute a façade that the present 
state wishes to show other states of the international community. It is question-
able that Italy had not taken action in the matter prior to the ECSR decision, 
especially given the importance of the rule of law in relation to democratic val-
ues and human rights. 
 
Specific protection for the practice of conscientious objection to abortion has 
not been voiced in the CoE, except for in resolution 1763 of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, where calls for an increased regulation of the practice were made. It 
has been shown that these calls for increased regulation of conscientious objec-
tion to abortion were primarily made to safeguard women's effective access to 
lawful abortion, not to reinforce the practice of conscientious objection in the 
CoE Member States. Having said this, it cannot be ruled out that the Assembly 
to some extent recommend states to adopt legislation on conscientious objec-
tion also for the sake of objectors. If resolution 1763 is read in the light of reso-
lution 1607, there is however an even stronger reason to interpret resolution 
1763 as a measure to prevent conscientious objection from obstructing women 
from accessing the healthcare to which they are entitled. These recommenda-
tions are, in any case, merely of a consultative character and not binding on 
states. 
 
A question is then if it could be possible to make an analogy between conscien-
tious objection within the military and conscientious objection in a healthcare 
setting. The one reason for this comparison was the fact that the Court has rec-
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ognised conscientious objection in relation to compulsory military service, in 
the Bayatyan v. Armenia case, but in no other context. One of the main dispari-
ties between the fields is their different natures. In the healthcare setting the 
highest objective is to save lives, whereas the highest objectives within the 
military can be both to save and to take lives. The natures of the employments 
are also different. Citizens are forced to partake in compulsory military service, 
whereas it is voluntary to seek employment as a healthcare provider. Another 
difference is that a citizen’s objection to mandatory military service might be 
harmful to societal interests, but it is in most situations not directly infringing 
the rights and freedoms of other citizens. Within the healthcare field, the rami-
fications could be different. If a healthcare provider refuses to provide abortion 
care to a woman, the woman’s right to access lawful abortion might be at risk. 
This is especially the case when a large number of healthcare providers object 
at the same time and place, as in Italy. Because of these discrepancies, this 
analogy is not clear-cut, but it could serve as a contrasting agent between the 
practice in these two fields. It might also provide some guidance in regards to 
the practice of conscientious objection in states where it is legal. The Court 
voiced a few, general prerequisites for practicing conscientious objection to 
mandatory military service in its judgment. For example, the internal conflict 
between a person’s beliefs and his or her task to provide abortion care would 
have to be serious and insurmountable. In case she or he invokes religious be-
liefs as a reason for objecting, those beliefs need to be deeply and genuinely 
held. In countries where conscientious objection is a lawful practice, these re-
quirements could serve as measures to accept a citizen’s objection. 
 
Another question is then if the Court’s judgment in the Bayatyan case could be 
used to interpret a Convention based right to conscientiously object to provid-
ing abortion as well. The Bayatyan v. Armenia judgment came after the R.R. v. 
Poland judgment, but before the P. and S. v. Poland judgment. This clearly 
shows that the fact that the Court recognised conscientious objection in the 
Bayatyan case is not an ‘evolutive’ interpretation of the Convention that also 
applies to abortion services, particularly since the Court in these cases ruled 
that the practice of conscientious objection infringed women’s right to access 
lawful abortion care and that the respondent state needed to control the practice. 
Since both cases concerned conscientious objection to abortion and women's 
lack of access to lawful abortions, the Court, if it considered that conscientious 
objectors were entitled to protection from the Convention, had every chance to 
clarify the situation, but did not. 
 
Several of the reviewed cases show that the use of conscientious objection in 
relation to abortion was not adequately regulated or controlled in the respon-
dent states. In the cases, R.R. v. Poland and P. and S. v. Poland, general confu-
sion permeated the treatment of the applicants and they were almost treated as 
criminals despite not having violated state law. The Court made it clear that 
CoE Member States were obliged to secure access to lawful abortions even if 
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they simultaneously recognise a right for healthcare providers to conscien-
tiously object. Essentially, this means that there is no prohibition for the Con-
tracting States to legalise conscientious objection in a healthcare setting on a 
national level, but it does not mean that states are under an obligation to legal-
ise the practice either. Ultimately, it is for each state to decide within its margin 
of appreciation whether it wants to recognise a right to conscientiously object 
or not and whether it would like to recognise a right to abortion or not. If it has 
recognised both these rights, it has to make sure that there are mechanisms in 
place to control the use of conscientious objection and to provide women with 
timely procedures to establish whether they have a right to abortion or not. 
 
Having enough available healthcare providers is essential to well-functioning 
healthcare. Therefore, whether it is in the interest of society to employ health-
care providers who object to performing certain tasks can be questioned, espe-
cially if there are other non-objecting healthcare providers available for em-
ployment. From the state point of view, securing human rights in the healthcare 
setting, in particular the rights of the patients, would certainly be easier without 
objecting healthcare providers. Nevertheless, the point of view of the employee 
must also be considered, bringing about the interest of non-discrimination. Be-
ing employed as a healthcare provider is not, however, a human right.  
 
It can be argued that healthcare providers actively should consult their con-
science and, where applicable, religion, before providing services within the 
professional sphere, and that orders from someone with superior authority 
should not be followed without reflection. However, if all healthcare providers, 
as representatives of the state, were to always act in line with their conscience, 
the rule of law would risk being disenabled. Democratically enacted laws 
would be rendered ineffective if healthcare providers could refuse to provide 
care within their respective area of expertise, if there is no strict control by the 
authorities. In such scenario, healthcare would no longer be provided under the 
laws, and there would be no proper foreseeability regarding healthcare proce-
dures. The rule of man would prevail over the rule of law. Because of this, there 
is a clear need for increased regulation, especially on a national level. The con-
trol by Council of Europe institutions and bodies also fills an important role, 
particularly in countries which recognise both the right to lawful abortion and 
the right to conscientiously object in a healthcare setting. 
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7 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has largely focused on the legal ‘gap’ in the Council of Europe regu-
lation in relation to conscientious objection to abortion. In order to unravel 
whether women’s access to lawful abortions can motivate limitations of health-
care providers’ conscientious objections, case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights has primarily been utilised. Decisions by the European Social 
Committee and resolutions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly have 
also been means of analysing and interpreting to what extent conscientious ob-
jection to abortion and women’s access to lawful abortion are rights under the 
legal documents of the Council of Europe. 
 
It has been shown that the right to manifest beliefs is not unlimited and that the 
rights and freedoms of others constitute a legitimate aim for the states to in-
fringe this right. Therefore, if conscientious objection to abortion qualifies as 
manifestation of belief under Article 9 ECHR, it is possible to limit this right 
through the rights and freedoms of others, namely women’s right to access law-
ful abortion services. 
 
The Court has recognised that Member States of the Council of Europe have a 
wide margin of appreciation with regards to both access to lawful abortion and 
conscientious objection to abortion and in relation to the balancing of these 
interests. However, as soon as states within the Council of Europe provide a 
legal right to obtain an abortion, the Court has emphasised that they are obliged 
to secure this right also in practice. The states have both positive and negative 
obligations in relation to access to lawful abortion. However, it has been 
showed that continuous violations have been made in several Council of 
Europe Member States in this regard. The lack of clear regulation and imple-
mentation of rules limiting conscientious objection in a number of European 
states, which recognise a right for healthcare providers to object to providing 
abortion services, cause women numerous problems in relation to their health, 
their freedom of expression and their private lives. 
 
As women’s access to abortion is infringed in several European countries, in-
creased regulation of conscientious objection to abortion seems motivated in 
states which have an established right to abortion and also recognises a right for 
healthcare providers to conscientiously object to abortion, in order to secure 
women’s de facto access to lawful abortion. 
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